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This dissertation studies some particular aspects of income and consumption of the
population of the Republic of Belarus, one of the least studied transition countries,
using a dataset virtually unknown to the Western researchers. In the rst chapter
the low level of income and expenditure inequality in Belarus is explained with the
use of Ukraine as a benchmark. Inequality decomposition by sources and application
of DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux counterfactual kernel densities show that the di¤erence in
inequality is explained by the income policies of the two countries. The second chapter
explores the roles played by small land plots in Belarus and Ukraine. The conclusion
is that less e¢ cient social safety net in Ukraine makes the urban poor use their land
plots as a subsistence mechanism, while in Belarus they use it mostly for leisure. The
third chapter explores the e¤ect of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster on schooling, labor
market and health outcomes in Belarus. The ndings are that younger children coming
from the more contaminated regions have more job-related health issues and lower
wages than those who were older at the time of the accident or who came from the
less contaminated regions. The absence of an e¤ect on education could be caused by




Tato disertaµcní práce vyuµzívá novµe dostupný unikátní soubor údaj°u ke studiu nµekterých
aspekt°u pµríjm°u a výdaj°u obyvatelstva Bµeloruské republiky, coµz je jedna z nejménµe
studovaných tranzitivních ekonomik. V první kapitole je vysvµetlena nízká nerovnost
pµríjm°u a výdaj°u v Bµelorusku pomocí srovnání se situací na Ukrajinµe. Rozklad nerovnosti
podle zdroj°u a vyuµzití simulovaného rozdµelení metodou DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux ukázalo,
µze rozdíl v nerovnosti je zp°usoben pµríjmovou politikou obou zemí. Druhá kapitola se
zabývá rolí malých zemµedµelských pozemk°u a zahrad v Bµelorusku a na Ukrajinµe pµri
obranµe pµred nízkými pµríjmy. Analýza naznaµcuje, µze kv°uli ménµe efektivní síti sociál-
ního zabezpeµcení na Ukrajinµe tamní chudí mµesttí obyvatelé pouµzívají tyto pozemky
jako náhradní zdroj potravin v rámci boje s chudobou, zatímco v Bµelorusku se tyto
pozemky vµetinou pouµzívají jen v rámci volnoµcasových aktivit. Tµretí kapitola zkoumá
vliv µcernobylské jaderné katastrofy na vzdµelávání, trh práce a zdraví v Bµelorusku. Mezi
hlavní zjitµení patµrí to, µze mladí dµeti (v dobµe katastrofy) z více kontaminovaných re-
gion°u mají v dospelosti více pracovních zdravotních problém°u a niµzí mzdy, neµz ti, kteµrí
byli starí v dobµe nehody nebo kteµrí pµrili z ménµe zneµcitµených region°u. Nulový efekt
kontaminace na vzdµelávání m°uµze být zp°usoben zvlátními privilegii pro vysokokolské
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The Republic of Belarus is one of the least studied transition countries. Yet because
of its lack of reforms, both on the supply side of the economy and on its social support
system, Belarus o¤ers an interesting benchmark case for studying many economic ques-
tions. This dissertation consists of three essays and uses a dataset virtually unknown
in the Western literature to study several uncommon aspects of income or consumption
of the Belarusian population.
The rst chapter, Inequality in Belarus from 1995 to 2008studies the inequality
in Belarus since 1995. When the USSR collapsed, inequality increased in all transition
economies, albeit to di¤erent levels. The existing literature suggests that countries that
were slow to undertake reforms had the biggest increases in inequality. The notable
exception is Belarus, one of the least reformed ex-Soviet republics, where inequality has
remained low. This essay studies the evolution of inequality in Belarus, decomposing
inequality by sources of income. A comparison of Belarus and Ukraine suggests that the
di¤erence in inequality is explained by the income policies of the two countries: Belarus
avoided mass privatization and kept many of the Sovietsocial security features.
The second chapter, Second agriculture in Belarus and Ukraine: subsistence or
leisure?studies the second agriculturein Belarus and its role. In many post-Soviet
countries, more than half of all urban households use small land plots to produce
signicant agricultural output even though their members have paid jobs or collect
state pensions. Existing studies suggest that in Russia such second agriculturehelps
smooth consumption during times of economic uncertainty. Using household budget
survey data, this essay studies the role of second agriculturein Belarus and Ukraine,
two countries that di¤er signicantly in the coverage of their social safety nets. In both
countries most urban households use their small land plots for leisure, and since the
mid-1990s they tend to decrease their use. The conclusion is that the Ukrainian urban
poor indeed use second agricultureto substitute for the lack of social transfers, while
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in Belarus the poor are better covered and for them it is more of a leisure activity.
The third chapter, Evidence from the Chernobyl accident: the e¤ect on schooling,
labor market and health outcomes in Belarus, co-written with Aliaksandr Amialchuk
and Mir Ali (the University of Toledo, USA), studies the e¤ect of the Chernobyl nu-
clear accident on wages and labor market attainments of the most a¤ected part of the
Belarusian population. The Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986 had deleterious health
consequences for the population of Belarus (in particular, thyroid malignancies), espe-
cially for children below 4 years of age at the time of the disaster. This essay utilizes
the natural experiment generated by this accident, which produced a sizable increase
in radiation levels in several regions of Belarus irrelative of any other factors. The
e¤ect of radiation on schooling, labor market and health outcomes among the cohorts
and regions that varied in the amount of exposure is estimated; the ndings are that
younger children coming from the more contaminated regions had more job-related
health issues and lower wages than those who were older at the time of the accident or
who came from the less contaminated regions. While the essay does not nd an e¤ect




Inequality in Belarus from 1995 to 20081
Abstract
Inequality increased in all transition economies, albeit to di¤erent levels. The exist-
ing literature suggests that countries that were slow to undertake reforms experienced
the biggest increases in inequality. The notable exception is Belarus, one of the least
reformed ex-Soviet republics, where inequality has remained low. This essay studies
the evolution of inequality in Belarus between 1995 and 2008, decomposing inequality
by sources of income. A comparison of Belarus and Ukraine suggests that the di¤erence
in inequality is explained by the di¤erent income policies of the two countries: Belarus
avoided mass privatization and kept many of the Soviet-erasocial security features.
Keywords: Belarus, Ukraine, transition, income inequality, expenditure inequality,
social security, DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux counterfactual kernel densities
JEL classication: D31, D63, H55, O15
1An earlier version of this work has been published as Yemelyanau, M. (2008). In-
equality in Belarus from 1995 to 2005. CERGE-EI WP No. 356, 55 p. I wish to
thank my advisor tµepán Jurajda for motivation, valuable comments, and helpful sug-
gestions. I would also like to thank Alena Biµcáková, Tom Coupé, Randall K. Filer, Igor
Livshits, Daniel Munich, Alina Verashchagina, and Viatcheslav Vinogradov for their use-
ful and pertinent comments. Many thanks go to Jody Ono, Robin-Eliece Mercury, and
Lawrence Smith for help with editing this paper. I am also very grateful to the National
Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus and the IPM Research Center (Minsk,
Belarus) for the data they provided. The purchase of the data was funded by Charles
University GAUK grant 257602 (project 60207). All errors remaining in this text are
the responsibility of the author.
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1.1 Introduction
Income and consumption inequality are often associated with greater poverty and more
social tensions.2 Because of these relationships and inequality indices are clear economic
indicators easily understood by the general public, inequality is of high concern among
policymakers.
Since the collapse of the central planning systems in Central and Eastern Europe,
inequality increased from its initial articially low levels in all post-communist coun-
tries, albeit to varying extents. While inequality rose only moderately in most central
European economies, it increased rapidly in most post-Soviet countries. The existing
literature (e.g., World Bank, 2000) suggests that post-communist countries that imple-
mented slower and less consistent pro-market reforms also saw the biggest increases in
overall inequality with the notable exception of the Republic of Belarus.
Although there is much research on inequality in most transition economies, in-
cluding the post-Soviet countries of Russia and Ukraine, the existing literature on
inequality3 in Belarus does not go beyond mentioning the overall inequality level in
this country (e.g., Milanovic, 1998; World Bank, 2000, 2004). This essay helps to ll
this gap in the literature by providing the rst detailed analysis of inequality in Belarus,
a country with an atypical transition path.
The lack of research on inequality in Belarus is not very surprising; Belarus remains
the least known European country for Western researchers, and one of the least known
countries of the former USSR.4 Yet because of its lack of reforms, both of the supply
side of the economy and of its social support system (noted, e.g., by the International
Monetary Fund [IMF], 2005, 2006), Belarus o¤ers an interesting benchmark case for
2It may also be associated with higher mortality, as discussed by Brainerd (1998, 2002), who nds
a negative and statistically signicant correlation between income inequality and the change in life
expectancy in Russia.
3Several articles by Pastore and Verashchagina (2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2011) study a narrower subject
of wages, especially their gender aspect.
4As of August 2011, the Scopus database lists only 97 economics, econometrics, and nance articles
containing the word Belarus in their titles or abstracts, versus 2002 for Russia, 688 for Ukraine,
1066 for Poland, and 297 and 160 for the small countries of Lithuania and Latvia, respectively. If
one takes CEE countries comparable by their population size, the numbers are 1121 for the Czech
Republic and 862 for Hungary.
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studying many economic questions including inequality. In many respects, Belarus can
be viewed as a country that is still in the early stages of transition.
Figure 1.1. Evolution of income inequality in selected transi-
tion countries measured by the Gini Index, 1989-2008
Source: TransMONEE 2010 Database, unless noted otherwise; Milanovic (1998, Table 4.1) for
Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine in 1989 and 1993; Kakwani (1995, Table 20) for Belarus, Russia, and
Ukraine in 1990; Russian GKS5 for Russia 1997-2008; the World Bank WDI6 for Ukraine 1996-1997,
2003-2005; authors own calculations based on BHBS for Belarus 1995-2008.
Note: The pre-1995 data for Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine are not very reliable. They are taken
from di¤erent sources and may not be directly comparable with both previous and subsequent periods
and with other countries (due primarily to the lack of data and di¤erent methodologies used).
Within the Soviet Union, Belarus had the lowest inequality level, with a Gini co-
e¢ cient of around 0.22, followed very closely by Russia and Ukraine (Dikhanov, 1996;
Kakwani, 1995). Historically these three countries share tight political, cultural, and
5Retrieved from http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/2005/b05_13/06-01.htm,
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/2006/b06_13/06-01.htm and http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/
new_site/population/urov/urov_32g.htm on April 28, 2011.
6Retrieved from http://go.worldbank.org/6HAYAHG8H0 on April 28, 2011.
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economic links, they followed somewhat similar transition paths, at least for most of
the 1990s (World Bank, 2002, Figure 2.1). In spite of these commonalities, Figure 1.1
shows that the evolution of inequality in these economies has been strikingly di¤erent.
While in Russia and Ukraine inequality doubled within just the rst few years after
the Soviet Unions breakup, reaching levels typical of some of the most unequal (and
poor) countries in the World, inequality trends in Belarus remained similar to those of
the Czech Republic and Hungary countries that had very di¤erent transition paths
and implemented quick and signicant pro-market reforms but also maintained income
equality with generous, Western-European-style social support systems (World Bank,
2000).
There are three possible main reasons for the low inequality in Belarus. The rst
is that the Belarusian population has some inherent features that assure low inequal-
ity even during major social and economic changes like the transition from plan to
market (e.g., Belarusians may have more homogeneous skills and education). The
second is that the Belarusian government deliberately kept inequality low (and ina-
tion/depreciation high) mainly by keeping many of the old Soviet social guarantees,
which were almost entirely abolished in Russia and Ukraine. The third is that in
Belarus the large Soviet enterprises have not been privatized, keeping many people
covered by the more compressed Sovietwage grid.
This essay aims to explain which of these potential explanations work and which
do not. Using the data from the Belarusian Household Budget Survey, it answers the
following questions: (i) What is the structure of household income and expenditure
inequality in Belarus? (ii) What was the inuence of the 1998 Russian nancial crisis7
on the level of inequality? (iii) Do demographic and labor market characteristics explain
the inequality gap between Belarus and Ukraine after 10 years of transition?
The essay is structured as follows: Section 1.2 provides a brief review of the liter-
ature on inequality in other transition countries; Section 1.3 gives some background
7This is the most important macroeconomic shock Belarus faced during its independence (before
the ongoing world economic crisis). Otherwise, the economic situation there has been remarkably
stable since the mid-1990s.
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information on the transition path of the Belarusian economy; Section 1.4 describes
the data used; Section 1.5 provides detailed information on the inequality in Belarus
and its breakdown by sources; Section 1.6 o¤ers a comparison of Belarus and Ukraine
using the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux Counterfactual Kernel Densities; and Section 1.7
concludes.
1.2 Literature review
A 2005 World Bank survey of poverty and inequality in Eastern Europe and the For-
mer Soviet Union during transition (Alam, Murthi, Yemtsov, Murrugarra, Dudwick,
Hamilton, and Tiongson, 2005) recounts:
The wage distribution was compressed under central planning because
of the egalitarian ideology and the centralized wage-setting mechanism. [...]
The new market economy environment has contributed to the widening of
wage disparities. Although the increase in wage disparities is consistent
with growing productivity di¤erentials, market distortions have also played
a role (particularly pronounced in CIS countries). The worst a¤ected have
typically been those who are the most vulnerable to shocks and least able to
adjust to the new market paradigms: mostly less skilled and older workers
(p.14).
Indeed, income and consumption/expenditure inequality increased8 in all transi-
tion economies during the late 1980s and 1990s. In central European countries such as
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland or the Baltic republics, this increase was modest.
8Some researchers (e.g., Garner and Terrell, 1998; Keane and Prasad, 2002) ask whether the
comparison of inequality indices before and after the transition is meaningful at all. They note the
distortion of pre-transition gures on income distribution and the use of surveys with di¤ering method-
ologies, coverage, and objectives. According to the World Bank (2000), pre-transition surveys were
usually not designed to be representative of the entire population but rather of certain socioeconomic
groups. As a result, they tended to be biased toward the average household and to exclude nonstan-
dard [sic] households in particular, marginal groups with a high probability of being poor. Thus, the
distribution of income was usually truncated, leading to an underestimation of true income disparities
(p. 142). Henderson, McNab and Rozsas (2008) report much higher values of Gini coe¢ cients for
pre-transition countries than Milanovic (1998) and other authors, but they obtain them by assuming
arbitrary values for average income values for population subgroups.
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On the other hand, the rise in inequality was dramatic in the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States (CIS). In Russia, Armenia, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan,
the Gini coe¢ cients for income almost doubled according to the World Banks WDI
and UNICEFs TransMONEE databases which both collect information from the na-
tional statistical o¢ ces.9 Measured by Gini coe¢ cients of 0.5 or more, inequality in
these countries is now comparable to levels observed in some of the most unequal
economies in Latin America. However, unlike in Latin America, where inequality has
been high but fairly stable, the deterioration of the income distribution in the CIS has
occurred within only a few years, resulting in an unprecedented magnitude and speed
of inequality change.
The existing literature usually attributes this surge in inequality to three main
factors: increase in wage disparities; government transfers and taxes; and rising edu-
cational premia.
Some authors (e.g., Milanovic, 1998) argue that the real increase in wage disparities
was the most important factor behind the increase in income inequality in transition
and not the underestimated and underreported inequality in the past. Aghion and
Commander (1999) study inequality in Russia and argue that the Kuznets curve repre-
sentation does not apply in this and other CIS countries, meaning that inequality is not
likely to fall away from its peak (as it did in Central Europe) because it settled early at a
higher persistent level due to big di¤erences in labour income within the private sector.
In the long run Aghion and Commander predict increases in both between and within
group inequality, because a deterioration in the education systems will further amplify
wage and earnings di¤erences between the skilled and the unskilled or between the
adaptable and the non-adaptable. Ganguli and Terrell (2005, 2006) examine changes
in wage inequality in Ukraine from 1986 to 2003. Applying the DiNardo, Fortin, and
Lemieux (1996) counterfactual decomposition method, they assert that changes in the
wage structure explain almost the entire rise in inequality. Although less important
9According to Luttmer (2001), these numbers may be overestimated by 10-45 percent because
of measurement errors and otherwise noisy data. On the other hand, they also may have been
underestimated before see the previous footnote.
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in its impact, changes in the composition of the labor force also a¤ected inequality in
Ukraine: they contributed to a reduction in the overall wage inequality of men and
also to an increase in inequality in the top half of the womens wage distribution.
Rising educational premia played a much less prominent role in the CIS than in
Central Europe, according to Alam et al. (2005), Lindauer (1998), Münich, Svejnar
and Terrell (2005), and Yemtsov (2001), among others. Pastore and Verashchagina
(2006b), on the contrary, nd high returns to education in Belarus, which is a-typical for
a transition country yet another peculiar feature of Belarus. In other CIS countries,
education explains only a small share of observed wage inequality, which could be
interpreted as reecting the low market value of the stock of education inherited from
the Soviet Union. Aivazian and Kolenikov (2001) assert that the shifts of human
capital and skills demand during the transition have ousted the Soviet middle class,
i.e., relatively qualied and more educated workers, who have had to look for other,
usually less protable, income sources. This search has been a¤ected adversely by low
labor mobility (primarily, geographical) typical for Russia. Brück, Danzer, Muravyev,
and Weißhaar (2010) nd a substantial level of extreme poverty in Ukraine in the
middle of the 1990s and greater poverty among households with children and with less
education. When comparing the years 1996 and 2004, Brück et al. nd a decline in
both poverty and inequality over the eight-year period, especially when measured by
income. On the other hand, they document an increase in socioeconomic stratication
over time and across space.
Government transfers and taxes are another key factor. In many countries the
Czech and Slovak Republics, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland, for example they have
played a signicant equalizing role, alleviating the e¤ect of rising earnings inequality.
In other countries (e.g. the Baltic states), such transfers have had almost no e¤ect. In
still others, most notably in Russia and to a lesser extent in other CIS countries, they
have actually contributed to increasing inequality since government size and transfers
have declined sharply (World Bank, 2000).
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Another possible factor is put forward by Berkowitz and Jackson (2006) who at-
tribute the di¤erences in the evolution of Polish and Russian income distributions
during the transition to di¤erent rates of entry of new enterprises. According to the
authors, Polands greater success in de novo rm entry contributes to its more eq-
uitable income distribution. Berkowitz and Jackson nd that new rm creation is
associated with both higher income and a larger portion of income distributed to the
lower quintiles, decreasing both poverty and inequality.
In general, the countries that implemented quicker and more determined reforms
saw the smallest increases in overall inequality. The countries that have lagged in
reforms, or undertaken reforms in an incomplete and inconsistent manner, have ex-
perienced the biggest increases in inequality.10 The World Bank (2000, pp. 163-164)
summarizes the root causes by citing three interrelated institutional factors: (1) a fail-
ure to implement the policies and institutions needed to allow product and factor
markets to operate e¤ectively; (2) the co-opting of national governments by vested
interests ... that have blocked reforms; and (3) the widespread rent-seeking behaviors
and corruption in public administration.
1.3 Economic background in Belarus
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, all ex-Soviet republics experienced severe
macroeconomic instability and sharp output declines. In Belarus, this fall was deepest
in 199294; this also was the period of some initial and indecisive market reforms.
Since the mid-1990s, the country tried to re-establish centralized state control over
the economy. So in the rst years of transition, Belarus essentially followed the same
transition path as other countries in the region did, but since 1995 they diverged. While
several reform measures were undertaken (notably, the lifting of price controls and the
elimination of most, but not all, energy cross-subsidization), Belaruseconomy remains
highly regulated and very strictly state controlled. The share of the private sector in
10This is why Belarus immediately stands out as a very particular case. It is one of the least
reformed post-Soviet countries, yet has low inequality typical of the most advanced transition countries
of Central Europe.
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GDP is only 25%, the lowest among all transition economies except Turkmenistan
(IMF, 2005). The majority of the population still works at state-owned enterprises
(SOEs): according to the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus,
in 1995 this share was almost 60%. While it has been decreasing since, to circa 50%
in 2008,11 large post-communist enterprises still employ virtually as many workers as
they did during the Soviet era.
The Belarusian government brought down ination only by the beginning of the
2000s (see Figure A1 in Appendix), not by the mid-1990s as most other transition
countries. The 1998 Russian nancial crisis was a major shock to the Belarusian
economy because of the tight economic links between the two countries.12 Ination in
Belarus (measured by the CPI) reached 182% p.a. in 1998 and 251% p.a. in 1999. Even
in 2008, 17 years after the start of transition, ination was more than 12% p.a. While
this is very low by Belarusian standards, it is still high compared with other transition
economies. Ination was accompanied by a rapid depreciation of the national currency;
the latter, but not the former, halted in 2003. The exchange rate of the Belarusian
ruble was pegged de facto to the US dollar until the very end of 2008.13
Unlike other transition economies, Belarus managed to overcome the initial GDP
decline very quickly (at least, according to the o¢ cial data). The country enjoyed
steady GDP growth from the mid-1990s, which sometimes reached 10% p.a. However,
this growth did not have much e¤ect on real wages. After the 1998 crisis, wages fell to
40 USD per month on average but then slowly recovered to 100 USD (a symbolic bar
set by the Belarusian government long before) only in 2003, accelerating their growth
to 200 USD in 2005, 300 USD in 2007 and 400 USD in 2008.
Unemployment has stayed low during the whole transition period, but again this
11Retrieved from http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/indicators/labor.php on April 28, 2011.
12At that time, Russia accounted for almost 2/3 of Belarusian exports and more than 1/2 of imports.
The situation has reversed since Belarusian exports became more diversied, while the reliance on
Russian raw materials and other supplies increased.
13As suggested by Randall K. Filer, ination can have a direct e¤ect on inequality measures because
high and low income consumers buy di¤erent product bundles and therefore are not a¤ected by the
changes in prices of di¤erent products in the same way. Unfortunately, no separate data on those
price changes are available.
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gure is from the o¢ cial data, which do not take into account hidden unemployment
and workers employed at the mostly ine¢ cient and over-sta¤ed large state-owned en-
terprises.
Overall, the Belarusian transition path was similar in many respects to Russias
and Ukraines, with comparable ination, depreciation, and wage levels. However, the
three Soviet republics that had the lowest inequality levels in 1990 Belarus, Russia,
and Ukraine have seen very di¤erent changes in inequality during their transitions
(see Figure 1.1). In Russia and Ukraine, inequality doubled by the mid-1990s, while in
Belarus it increased only slightly, remaining very low at the level of the most successful
and advanced transition countries of Hungary and the Czech Republic.
1.4 Methodology and data description
Studies of inequality in Russia and other post-Soviet countries using income data are
made di¢ cult by the expansion of wage arrears and by the increasing importance
of informal economic activities in the 1990s (the income from these activities is very
unlikely to be reported truthfully). Therefore, I apply the standard inequality measures
(see the Appendix for a description) and their decompositions both to expenditure and
to income inequality (in order to make cross-country comparisons possible).
Unfortunately, there are no reliable and consistent data on inequality in Belarus
for the rst few years of transition (1991-1994). Only from 1995, when the Belarusian
Household Budget Survey14 (BHBS) was started, can one construct adequate measures
of inequality among the Belarusian population. This yearly survey is designed to be
representative of the total Belarusian population (excluding only students living in
dormitories, soldiers in barracks and homeless people), unlike the Soviet surveys that
usually included only full-time workers. Each observation includes sampling weights
inversely proportional to the probability of being sampled and corrections for unit non-
14This project was established with assistance from the World Bank and the Sta-
tistical O¢ ce of the European Commission (Eurostat); the quality of the data is at
the level of similar surveys in other European countries. The results are published
on a regular basis, see, e.g., http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/publications/1-09n.htm and
http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/publications/2-11n.htm
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response to the interview. Therefore the survey replicates the structure of Belarusian
population very well, e.g., it very slightly undersamples the unemployed (6.1% of the
economically active population versus 6.2% in the results of the 1999 census) and people
with secondary education (69% of population older than 15 versus 71% in the census)
but oversamples the rural population (31.8% versus 30.7%).
The data used in this essay are pooled cross-sections from 1995 to 2008 obtained
from the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus. Each cross-section
contains approximately 5,000 households representing the whole population of Belarus.
Each observation includes detailed information about the household and its members,
a breakdown of income15 and expenditures by categories, more detailed data on food
consumption, and information about dwellings. The data on income and expenditure
are monthly averages for a given year. They are collected quarterly using a diary
completed by households and survey questions asked by interviewers.
I also use data on individuals that form the households in question (approximately
14,000 observations for each yearly cross-section), including their age, socioeconomic
status, wages and other sources of income, number of children, information on their
education, work experience, and health.
This dataset has only been used very little in the Western scientic literature,
though there are some papers written in Russian by local researchers. The only articles
in which it is used are written by Pastore and Verashchagina (2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2011),
studying the returns to human capital and the gender wage gap in 1996 and 2001.
The data are in nominal terms, which in the Belarusian case complicates the com-
parisons with other countries and between di¤erent years mainly because of high in-
ation in 1991-2001 and the de facto pegged exchange rate in 2004-2008. Therefore
neither the use of CPI nor the exchange rate (market or PPP) lead to absolutely con-
sistent and convincing gures in real terms. While inequality measures are relative
15The total income as dened by the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus
includes the receipts from sale of real estate and other similar items (e.g. loans and operations
with shares and other securities) that are more related to assets than to income. To obtain a better
and more methodologically sound estimate of inequality, I subtract those sources from income and
expenditure. All graphs and tables in this paper contain the updated estimates.
13
and thus do not depend on the choice of base year or exchange rate, to study poverty
(a phenomenon closely linked with inequality) in Belarus one needs to convert all the
data properly into real terms. Because this methodological problem has not yet been
solved, in this essay I study inequality only.
The data used for Ukraine come from a similarly constructed Ukrainian Household
Budget Survey with the same variables, but have a larger number of observations
(approximately 9,000 households versus 5,000 for Belarus) that account for the bigger
population of Ukraine.
1.5 Inequality evolution and its decomposition
Income inequality in Belarus reached its peak in the mid-1990s (see Figure 1.1). After
1995, it stayed at a low and quite stable level16 (as Figure 1.2 shows) as measured
by both the Theil and Gini indices. Expenditure (but not income) inequality rose in
1999, just following the Russian nancial crisis, and continued to fall thereafter. The
downward trend reversed in 2004 when both income and expenditure inequality started
to rise, albeit slowly. It is not clear whether this change continued beyond 2008 as the
Belarusian Statistical O¢ ce refuses to share (or even sell) the BHBS data for 2009 and
2010, and what factors are driving it.
16These results are consistent with the data from the other sources, e.g. the TransMONEE Database
(UNICEF IRC, Florence), where data are ...collected directly from National Statistical O¢ ces using
a standardized template (http://www.transmonee.org/). There are some minor discrepancies (still
within the 95% condence interval) that most probably are due to di¤erences in equivalence scales
and sampling weights, but the overall trend clearly is the same.
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Figure 1.2. Evolution of the Gini index in Belarus
Source: Authors own calculations based on the BHBS.
Note: Thin lines show 95% condence intervals calculated with bootstrapping (100 repetitions).
Constructed in Stata using the ineqerr .ado module. Other inequality indices (Theil, Varlogs, and
coe¢ cient of variation) follow exactly the same pattern.
Remarkably, in Belarus the inequality of expenditure is much higher than theinequal-
ity of income (I consider this atypical phenomenon in more detail in Section 1.5.3).
Nevertheless, both inequality measures still are lower than in other post-Soviet coun-
tries17.
Income inequality in Belarus is spread almost uniformly across regions, with no sig-
nicant di¤erence in the various regionscontributions to inequality. The country-wide
changes in inequality levels over the years are due mainly to changes in inequality in
the capital city of Minsk. This city also has a slightly higher inequality level compared
to other regions (these results are available upon request).
17Unfortunately, unlike income inequality, expenditure inequality indices are not collected using
comparable methodologies nor reported by international organizations.
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1.5.1 Inequality decomposition18 by sources
As shown in Table 1.1, wages are by far the most important source of income in
Belarus. Income from small land plots (both monetary and in-kind) was the second
most important income source in the mid-1990s, but its share has been decreasing
steadily ever since. The share of pensions (retirement benets), on the contrary, is
rising (see also the rst graph of Figure 1.3). This may be one of the factors keeping
overall inequality low, since the contribution of pensions to total inequality is much
smaller than the pensions contribution to total income (Table 1.2) a sign of the
importance of government transfers.
Figure 1.3. Inequality decomposition by income sources
18Performed in Stata using the ineqfac module for details see Appendix.
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Source: Authors own calculations based on the BHBS.
Note: The decomposition by income sources was performed in Stata using the ineqfac .ado module;
sei = self-employment income; incm_agr = income from sale of agricultural products from small land
plots plus income in kind; oth_incm includes dividends, unemployment benets; child allowances,
other state subsidies, nancial assistance received from friends and relatives. The contribution of
pensions is negative except for 2005-2007.
Table 1.1. Share in total income, %
income source 1995 1999 2003 2007
wages 52.3 54.0 63.5 61.5
self-employment income 3.6 3.3 3.1 2.6
pensions 12.9 11.8 15.6 20.5
income from small land plots 25.6 21.6 12.6 7.2
other 5.1 9.2 5.0 8.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 1.2. Proportionate contribution to total inequality, %
income source 1995 1999 2003 2007
wages 64.3 66.2 75.8 73.4
self-employment income 9.5 10.4 3.6 5.9
pensions -2.0 -2.2 -0.4 12.7
income from small land plots 20.6 16.9 5.0 1.8
other 6.5 8.5 16.0 6.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Authors own calculations based on the BHBS.
Note: Income from small land plotsincludes both the sales of agricultural products and income
in kind; otherincludes dividends and unemployment benets, child allowances, other state subsidies,
and nancial assistance received from friends and relatives but excludes receipts from personal and
household property sale and receipts from the sale of real estate. Both share and contribution of
dividends and unemployment benets, taken separately, are insignicant. Individual values may not
sum up to 100% due to rounding.
Note that the contribution of pensions to inequality is negative until 2005, meaning
that this source of income has had an equalizing e¤ect. This contribution is positive
from 2005 onwards when there was a change in the retirement law (the size of pen-
sions was increased, but they became less egalitarian with amounts more linked to the
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previous wages of the retiree). At the same time, Belarus saw a small rise in income
inequality (Figure 1.2), and pensions explain much of this increase. Notice also that
the contributions to inequality and the shares in total income of Income from small
land plotsand Self-employment incomedecreased from the mid-1990s.19
1.5.2 The Russian nancial crisis of 1998 and its e¤ect on
Belarus
The crisis of 1998 did not have a large e¤ect on inequality in Belarus although it
a¤ected many other economic indicators dramatically (see Section 1.3). For example,
GDP growth20 remained positive but was the lowest since 1995. Income inequality did
not change at all (and was remarkably stable in subsequent years), and expenditure
inequality rose only slightly and then declined thereafter (see Figure 1.2).
1.5.3 Income versus expenditure inequality
One of the striking features of inequality in Belarus is that the inequality of income is
lower than the inequality of expenditure, while studies of other transition economies
(e.g., Yemtsov, 2001 for Georgia) usually nd the opposite mainly because low-income
households tend to borrow to sustain a higher consumption level.21
In the absence of the underreporting of income and consumption, these di¤erences
in inequality would imply a very di¤erent propensityfor savings along income levels
as, in principle, the equality savings = income   consumption should hold. Indeed
in general, the poor save less in absolute terms, but they save a higher fraction of
their income than the rich. However, this fact does not su¢ ce to explain the higher
expenditure inequality in Belarus. Many of the (very) poor have negative savings,
19The share of this income source remaining stable, the decrease in its inequality contribution may
be explained by the fact that while in the 1990s the self-employed usually had higher than the average
income, in the 2000s their income became virtually the same as employed workers.
20Despite the extensive literature on inequality and growth, the exact nature of this relationship
is still disputed. Some studies (e.g., Miyazawa, 2006; Sukiassyan, 2007) nd that the relation is
negative, while others assert it is positive (e.g., García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky, 2006; Lopez, 2007).
In the case of Belarus, I did not nd any signicant relationship between them. The Gini index for
income uctuates within less than 1 percentage point for the whole 14 years of my sample, and its
95% condence intervals hardly change at all (see Figure 2).
21To my knowledge, there are no theories that could explain the reversed situation in Belarus.
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like in other transition countries, where the inequality of income is higher than the
inequality of expenditure. Only the underreporting of expenditures could explain the
di¤erences of inequalities in Belarus. And underreporting is more prevalent among
people with higher income. One reason is since there are higher prices and less choice
of (high-quality) imported goods and services in Belarus, many Belarusians prefer to
shop abroad, usually in Moscow, Kyiv, Vilnius, or Warsaw.22 Of course, these are
more a­ uent people, and the practice is virtually impossible to measure directly. The
apparent convergence of income and expenditure inequality over the years (Figure 1.2)
thus may mean that the underreporting of expenditures has increased, reaching the
level of income underreporting. This phenomenon (when people not only have some
hiddenincome, but also spend it secretly) again is virtually impossible to measure.
Only some very rough indirect estimates could be constructed, e.g., by using the number
of visas issued to Belarusians.23





















income expenditure difference (right scale)
22In 2008, Belarusians crossed the state border 12.7 million times for a population of slightly less
than 10 million. (State Frontier Committee, retrieved from http://gpk.gov.by/ru-safety-osd/)
23Unfortunately, even these estimates necessarily will be biased downwards as Belarusian citizens
do not need visas to visit Ukraine or Russia.
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Source: Authors own calculations based on the BHBS.
Note: Negative values mean that the income share is lower than the expenditure share for the
bottom decile. Any changes are relative to the position of other decile groups.
To shed more light on the possible underreporting of income and expenditures and
changes in these practices over time, I decompose the income and expenditures of
Belarusian households by income deciles. This decomposition, shown in Tables A2 and
A3 (both in Appendix) and in Figure 1.4, reveals two interesting patterns.
First, the shares of decile groups are virtually constant during 1995-2007, with
only three exceptions: (a) a huge drop in the income share of the poorest 10% of
the population, concurrent with the 1998 Russian nancial crisis (from 4.2% in 1997
to 2.7% in 1998 and 3.1% in 199924). The poorest saw their income plummet, but
managed to smooth their expenditures during the crisis by borrowing; (b) a drop in
the expenditure share of the poorest decile from 3.6% in 2004 to 2.4% in 2005. In
2005, the retirement benets were increased and many pensioners (who according to
normal economic logic should be dissaving or at least less prone to save) left the bottom
decile, so the number of saversamong the poor increased; (c) a gradual decrease of
the expenditure share of the richest 10% (but not of the corresponding income share).
This is the primary reason for the overall decrease in expenditure inequality (Figure
1.2), but it may correspond to an increase in expenditure underreporting.
Second, except for the poorest 10% of the population (whose income and expendi-
ture shares change considerably from one year to the next), the di¤erence between in-
come and expenditure shares decreases with the increase of income, but hardly changes
over time. The poorest have income shares that are considerably higher than their
expenditure shares, while the richest have expenditure shares that are higher but de-
creasing. Indeed this is a sign of income underreporting among richer Belarusians, but
there is no sign that this practice is on the decline on the contrary, it seems to be
accompanied by a growing underreporting of expenditure.
24Taking into consideration the overall decrease of income, this relative drop is even higher in
absolute terms.
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1.6 Belarus versus Ukraine
1.6.1 Transition paths and inequality
Ukraine is the best reference countryfor Belarus similar in many respects (e.g. the
structures of the industry or the transition paths in the 1990s) di¤erent in others (e.g.
the political situation and the government transfers). Belarus and Ukraine are also
very close historically, culturally, and economically. To keep the comparisons simple
and save space, I compare the snapshotsof the two economies in 2002 by that time
both countries had already undergone 10 years of transition, and the impact of the 1998
Russian crisis was already absorbed (all gures in this section are for the year 2002
and come from Belarusian and Ukrainian national statistical o¢ ces, unless explicitly
noted otherwise).
Table 1.3. Inequality decomposition by income sources, % (in
2002)
income sources share sources contribution sources contribution
source to inequality (absolute) to Gini index
Ukraine Belarus Ukraine Belarus Ukraine Belarus
wages 50.1 61.3 48.0 74.3 20.1 17.5
self-employment income 4.0 3.9 4.2 7.1 1.8 1.7
pensions 15.0 15.9 9.7 -0.4 4.1 -0.1
income from land plots 20.1 13.4 25.2 6.3 10.5 1.5
other 10.8 5.5 12.9 12.7 5.3 3.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 41.8 23.6
Source: Authors own calculations based on the BHBS and the UHBS.
Note: The decomposition by income sources was performed in Stata using the ineqfac .ado module.
Individual values may not sum up to 100% due to rounding.
Ukrainian households were getting a half of their income from wages, 4% from
self-employment, 15% from pensions, stipends and other social security transfers, 20%
from their land plots (both from sales and in-kind) and the rest from other sources,
including 8.6% as nancial assistance received from relatives, friends or charitable
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organizations. Overall, the income source shares are quite similar in both countries
with two notable exceptions. In Belarus, wages play a more important role (more than
60%), while income from land plots is substantially more important in Ukraine both
by share (20% vs. 13%) and inequality contribution (25% vs. 6%).25
It may appear that the social security systems are quite similar in both countries,
but in fact they are not. The rst reason is in Ukraine, the unemployed form 10.3%
(o¢ cial gure26) or 17.2% (my calculations from UHBS) of the economically active
population, while in Belarus the corresponding estimates are only 3.0%27 or 5.8% re-
spectively. Yet the average shares and contributions of the unemployment benets are
very close in both countries meaning that in Belarus, unemployment benets are more
generous. The second reason is payment arrears are still widely spread in Ukraine as
of 2002 (Berry and Schelzig, 2005) but virtually eliminated in Belarus (World Bank,
2004). Furthermore, the nancial assistance received from relatives, friends or char-
itable organizations is very signicant in Ukraine (8.6% of total income), while in
Belarus it is not.28
As for the expenditures, Ukrainian households spent on average 123.5 USD29 per
month and per household, of which 59.1% was on food, while in Belarus households
spent 154 USD and with the food share being only 43.9%, suggesting that Ukrainian
households are on average poorer than Belarusian ones. Ukrainian households also
spend more than they get (on average), which can be explained by borrowing and
income underreporting.
I calculate the Gini and Theil indices for Ukraine using the micro-data from the
25I investigate the phenomenon of small land plots in more detail in the second essay of this
dissertation.
26Retrieved from http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2006/rp/prc_rik/
prc_r/osp_rik_r.htm on April 28, 2011.
27Retrieved from http://www.belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/indicators/svodn_2000-2005.php on April
28, 2011.
28According to the Migration and Remittances Team (Development Prospects Group, World Bank),
the o¢ cially recorded inow of remittances in 2002 was 141 million USD in Belarus and 209 million
USD in Ukraine, while the outow was 68 million USD from Belarus and only 15 million USD from
Ukraine. However, the true size of remittances, including unrecorded ows through formal and
informal channels, is believed to be larger.(World Bank, 2008)
29All conversions into USD were performed using the market exchange rate.
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Ukrainian HBS and the same methods and formulas I applied to BHBS. The results
for Ukraine are the following: Gini coe¢ cients for income/expenditure are 0.418/0.411,
and for Theil are 0.291/0.280. Note that the coe¢ cients for income and expenditure
are very close, in fact their 95% condence intervals overlap. Note also that in Ukraine,
the inequality of income is higher than the inequality of expenditure, which is more
intuitive than in the Belarusian case.
Table 1.4. Decile shares of income and expenditure, % (in 2002)
Decile Income share Expenditure share
group Ukraine Belarus di¤erence, p.p. Ukraine Belarus di¤erence, p.p.
bottom 10% 0.9 3.7 -2.9 1.3 3.2 -1.9
2 2.9 6.0 -3.0 2.9 5.1 -2.1
3 4.2 7.1 -2.9 4.3 6.2 -1.9
4 5.6 8.0 -2.4 5.8 7.2 -1.4
5 7.0 8.8 -1.8 7.2 8.3 -1.0
6 8.8 9.7 -0.9 8.8 9.4 -0.6
7 10.9 10.7 0.2 10.9 10.7 0.2
8 13.7 12.1 1.7 13.6 12.4 1.2
9 17.6 14.1 3.6 17.3 14.9 2.4
top 10% 28.4 20.0 8.4 27.9 22.7 5.2
Source: Authors own calculations based on the BHBS and UHBS.
Note: A negative di¤erence means that the decile group in Ukraine is getting a lower income
(expenditure) share than the same decile group in Belarus. The bigger the negative di¤erence, the
poorer the Ukrainian decile is relative to the Belarusian decile and vice versa. Individual values may
not sum up to 100% due to rounding.
The comparison of decile shares for income and expenditure in Table 1.4 reveals ad-
ditional interesting patterns. Income and expenditure decile shares are almost equal in
Ukraine but very di¤erent in Belarus (see section 1.5.3 for a discussion). Nevertheless,
the distribution of income is clearly more compressed in Belarus.
A World Bank (2007) country brief characterizes Belarus as having a ...compre-
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hensive social security and good basic health and education services [that] have been
sustained since independence and remain available.AnotherWorld Bank (2004) report
states that ...the Republic of Belarus has a well-developed system of social support.
More than 14% of GDP or 31% of the consolidated budget expenditure in 2002 was
channeled to social assistance and insurance programs.30 In addition, it is estimated
that quasi-scal social transfers by enterprises were equivalent to about 2-3% of GDP
(p.59). As for Ukraine, a similar report (World Bank, 2005) explains: The di¤erences
in coverage and on pension benets across income groups result in a regressive inci-
dence. Pension benets are similar across beneciary households, with the poor earning
8 percent lower pensions compared to the better o¤. These smaller pensions, combined
with [a] slightly lower coverage of pensions among the poor result in an unequal dis-
tribution of benets... There are major gaps in terms of coverage and targeting of
the poor(p. 45). This explains why pensions played an important role in reducing
inequality in Belarus, at least before 2005, but not in Ukraine.
On the other hand, the share of people working at state-owned enterprises is high
in Belarus, decreasing from 60% in 1995 to circa 50% in 2008. In Ukraine, this share
was much lower already in 1999, reaching only 31%.31 Because wages are by far the
most important sources of income and contribute to inequality in both countries, this
should explain, at least partially, the lower inequality levels in Belarus.32
My overall conclusion about the transition paths of the two countries is that they
started their transition with the same initial conditions (including very similar income
distributions), and by 2002 they had grown apart in some features (e.g. employment at
state-owned enterprises and social transfers), but remained close in others (e.g. weak
development of self-employment and unnaturally low o¢ cial levels of unemployment).
30However, among all social security transfers, only pensions play a signicant role, while all other
transfers (e.g., unemployment benets) are negligible and received by few households.
31Retrieved from http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/katalog/kat_e/cat8_e.htm on April 28, 2011.
32Conrming this conclusion, Pastore and Verashchagina (2006b) document a dominant role of the
Belarusian state in the distribution of wages.
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1.6.2 DFL Counterfactual Kernel Densities
The decomposition of inequality by income sources provides some explanation of dif-
ferent inequality levels in Belarus and Ukraine, but what factors are more important
in accounting for these di¤erences: (1) di¤erences in the income structure or (2) dif-
ferences in the distribution of characteristics of the people?
The most common approach used to compare and decompose gender and other
earning di¤erentials is the Oaxaca (1973) decomposition. This approach, however, is
limited to explaining di¤erences in means of wages and mean characteristics. DiNardo,
Fortin and Lemieux (1996), hereafter DFL, have developed a methodology for decom-
posing the entire densities. They present a way of studying the e¤ect of changes in
structural variables on the distribution of income (wages, expenditure, etc.) and in
particular on income inequality. Their semiparametric approach is based on the con-
struction of counterfactual densities by re-weighting the original population according
to the changes in underlying characteristics, generalizing the ideas of Oaxaca. The
DFL procedure allows us to refer to the distribution as a whole, instead of focusing on
specic aggregate measures.
The DFL methodology can be presented as follows: Each individual observation
is viewed as a vector (w; z; t), where w is the wage (or income/expenditure), z is the
vector of individual attributes, and t is the date. The joint distribution of wages and
attributes conditional on the date can be dened as F (w; zjt). The density of wages at
some time, ft(w) is then expressed as the integral of the density of wages, conditional
on some individual attributes and on the date tw, f(wjz; tw), over the distribution of
individual attributes F (zjtz) at date tz, or:
f(w; tw = t; tz = t) =
Z
z
dF (w; zjtw;z = t); (1.1)
where the set of wages w come from period tw, and the set of characteristics z come
from period tz.
The counterfactual for z from  , f(w; tw = t; tz = ), can be expressed as re-
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weighted actual
f(w; tw = t; tz = ) =
Z
z
f(wjz; tw = t)	z(z)dF (zjtz = t); (1.2)
where
	z(z) =
dF (zjtz = )
dF (zjtz = t)
(1.3)
Instead of two di¤erent dates, one can use other binary criteria, say women/men,
employed/unemployed, etc. or compare the populations of two di¤erent countries.33
The continuous version of the DFLmethod was implemented in Stata software (starting
from version 9.0) by de Azevedo.34
Using the semi-parametric procedure from DFL, I develop counterfactual densities
of total income35 of Belarusian and Ukrainian populations in 2002. In particular, I esti-
mate the density that would have existed in Belarus if the distribution of demographic
and other characteristics of the population was as in Ukraine:
f(w; tw = Belarus; tz = Ukraine) =
Z
f(wjz; tw = Belarus)	z(z)dF (zjtz = Belarus)
(1.4)
and 	z(z) is a reweightingfunction, where
	z(z) =
dF (zjtz = Ukraine)







The weight 	z(z) the probability of living in country t, given an individuals char-
acteristics z is estimated using a logit36 or probit model, which predicts the probabil-
33Data comparability across countries might be a problem, but not in this case as I am using the
data from two identically constructed household budget surveys.
34His .ado code is based on the original DFL paper and on Van Kerm (2003).
35I also construct the counterfactual densities of expenditure. Because the demographic and other
characteristics of the population a¤ect income more directly, the distributions of expenditure in the
two countries are much closer to each other than the distributions of income. Still, both the actual
density for Ukraine and the counterfactual density for Belarus have lower mean and higher variance
than the actual density for Belarus.
These additional results are available upon request.
36The logit model I use is of the form p(Ukraine = 1) = exp(0 + zZ)=(1 + exp(0 + zZ)). The
re-weight is created by multiplying the sample weight by p=(1 p), where p is the predicted probability
from the logit model.
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ity Prob(tz = Ukrainejz) and Prob(tz = Belarusjz) for each individual in the sample.
Using the re-weighted sample, I then calculate the counterfactual measures of income
levels and use kernel density estimates to draw their counterfactual densities. These
counterfactual density functions show the income density that would have prevailed
in Belarus if the distribution of demographic and other characteristics (age, gender,
place of residence: capital/city/town/village, land plot ownership, number of children,
education, employment status37, and socio-economic category: student, retired, self-
employed, blue- and white-collar worker) there was as in Ukraine.38
The application of the DFL Counterfactual Kernel Densities method to Belarus and
Ukraine in 2002 yields the following results seen in Figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5. The DFL Counterfactual Kernel Densities estima-
tion
37Because of very low o¤cial levels of unemployment in both countries, this factor turns out to be
non-signicant.
38Unfortunately, both HBS do not contain data on whether the respondents work on private or
state-owned entreprises.
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Source: Authors own calculations based on the BHBS.
Note: Constructed in Stata using the d.ado (written by de Azevedo, University of Newcastle).
The rst graph compares the actual distribution of income of Belarusians with
the counterfactual distribution (if Belarusians were Ukrainians). The counterfac-
tual density has a lower mean and a higher dispersion, meaning that if Belarusians
were living under Ukrainian circumstances, they would have lower income but higher
income inequality (what we do observe in reality). The second graph compares the
counterfactual distribution for Belarus with the actual distribution for Ukraine. The
two densities are much closer than on the rst graph, meaning that the di¤erences are
mainly due to di¤erent s (government and labor market conditions) than to di¤erent
zs (demographic and other characteristics).
The di¤erences in inequality between Belarus and Ukraine should thus be attributed
to the di¤erent policies of their governments, not to di¤erent characteristics of their
people as on average both populations have similar education, work experience, age,
and other characteristics. The growing share of retirement benets in the income of
Belarusians (see Section 1.5.1, Table 1.1, and Figure 1.3) would suggest that inequality
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in Belarus was preserved at low levels (compared to Ukraine) by keeping many of the
old Soviet social security features (and government transfers) in Belarus and disman-
tling/reducing them in Ukraine, but also because most people in Belarus still work at
large SOEs.
1.7 Conclusions
Using the data from the Belarusian and Ukrainian Household Budget Surveys (BHBS
and UHBS), I nd that inequality in Belarus was low and virtually stable in 1995-2008,
with a small rise in 1998 due to the Russian nancial crisis and a weak upward trend
since 2004. This result is the same whether I use Gini or Theil indices and whether I
calculate them for income or expenditures.
The inequality decomposition by income sources shows that the income sources with
the highest share (wages, pensions, income from the land plots, and self-employment
income) have the highest contribution to total inequality, with the share and contribu-
tion of wages growing over time and those of self-employment income and income from
small land plots decreasing.
The two Soviet republics that had the lowest inequality levels in 1990 have seen a
very di¤erent evolution of inequality during the transition period: In Ukraine, it almost
doubled, in Belarus it remained very close to the pre-transition level. The application of
the DFL method to both countries shows that (in 2002) their populations on average
had the same demography, employment and other characteristics, and the observed
di¤erences in inequality levels are likely due to government policies, such as keeping
many of the old Soviet social security features (and government transfers) in Belarus
and dismantling/reducing them in Ukraine and by keeping large Belarusian SOEs un-
privatized. Another important factor is pensions: they are an important income source
in both countries, but in Belarus they contribute to equality, in contrast to Ukraine.
The overall conclusion is that the Belarusian government was quite successful in
keeping an egalitarian society as economic growth (6% p.a. on average during the last
decade, IMF, 2006) didnt result in a signicant increase of income inequality among
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people; however, expenditure inequality was noticeably higher.
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There are many measures of income/expenditure inequality39; the most popular and
widely used is the Gini index40, which is easily available for virtually all countries and
for many years, making possible cross-country and inter-temporal comparisons. It can
be calculated for any type of income/wealth as well as for expenditure/consumption,
the second option is more preferable because of the systematic under-reporting of in-
come in the surveys in post-Soviet countries (for discussion see, e.g., Yemtsov, 2001).
To overcome this drawback, I calculate and report inequality indices for both income
and expenditure.








i=1 (n+ 1  i) yiPN
i=1 yi
!
, where yi  yi+1. (1.6)
The smaller the coe¢ cient, the less unequal the distribution. When it equals 0,
meaning perfect equality, everyone has the same income or consumption, when it equals
1, meaning total inequality, one person possesses all the income.
For a random sample S of size n with the values of yi (i = 1 to n) that are ranked











is a consistent estimator of the population Gini coe¢ cient.
The Gini coe¢ cient is the most popular and widely used inequality measure, but
unfortunately it is not directly decomposable even though various indirect methods of
39They date back to the seminal work of Dalton (1920) and the works of Gini and other Italian
researchers.
40The Gini index is the Gini coe¢ cient expressed as a percentage.
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decomposition exist, e.g., the one proposed by Shorrocks (1982). The contribution of
any income source to overall income inequality is:
sk(I) =
S(Y k; Y )
I(Y )
=
cov(Y k; Y )
2(Y )
for all Y 6= y, (1.8)
where Y ki denotes the income of the individual i (i = 1; : : : ; N) from the source
k (k = 1; : : : ; K); Y = (Y1; : : : ; YN) =
P
k Yk represents the distribution of total in-
comes; Sk(Y1; ::; Yk;K) represents the absolute contribution of the source k to the total
inequality. This decomposition does not depend on the choice of inequality measure,
but is usually applied to the Gini index.
Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) proposed a set of decomposable inequality
and poverty measures which allows for the analysis of the relation between poverty
and specic household characteristics. One of the special cases of their measures is the
Theil Index. This summary statistic measures income inequality based on information
entropy. It is similar to, but less commonly used than the Gini coe¢ cient. The Theil












The rst term inside the sum stands for the individuals share of aggregate income,
and the second term is that persons income relative to the mean. If everyone has
the same income, then the index equals 0 (perfect equality). If one person has all the
income, then the index equals ln(N).
The advantage of this inequality measure over the Gini is that the underlying pop-
ulation can be divided into groups using any criteria (regional, demographic, socio-
economic etc.), and the Theil index for the whole population will (by construction) be
equal to the weighted sum of Theil indices for groups plus the Theil index for inequal-
ity between groups, so the Theil index is directly decomposable without any special
methods. The Theil index for a country with the population of N people living in K
regions can be decomposed into 2 parts:
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(derived from Conceição and Ferreira, 2000).
Another commonly used inequality measure is the coe¢ cient of variation which is
a measure of dispersion of a probability distribution. It is dened as the ratio of the





The coe¢ cient of variation is a dimensionless number. For distributions of positive-
valued random variables, it allows a comparison of the variation of populations that
have signicantly di¤erent mean values. It is often reported as a percentage by mul-
tiplying the result of the calculation by 100. The absolute value of the coe¢ cient of
variation expressed as a percentage is often referred to as the relative standard devia-
tion (RSD or %RSD).
Apart from the Gini and Theil indices and the coe¢ cient of variation, there are
other insightful but less commonly used inequality measures which include the Kak-
wani measure and Atkinsons social-welfare measures (Atkinson, 1970; Kakwani, 1979,
1981).
Inequality decomposition by factors
The Stata module ineqfac provides an exact decomposition of the inequality of total
income into inequality contributions from each of the factor components. Shorrocks
(1982) proved that there was a unique decomposition rulefor which inequality in total
income across observations could be expressed as the sum of inequality contributions
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from each of the factor components. The decomposition rule is the proportionate





where f is the correlation between f and total income, and sd() is the standard
deviation. (Equivalently, sf is the slope coe¢ cient from the regression of factor f on
total income.) For each observation
P
sf = 1. Factor components with a positive
value of sf make a dis-equalizing contribution to total inequality, those with negative
values make an equalizing contribution.
Shorrocks showed that the choice of the decomposition rule does not depend on
which inequality index is used.
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Figure A1. Monthly price indices in Belarus (in %)
Source: IPM Research Center (Minsk, Belarus; http://www.research.by).
Note: In January 1992, when the major wave of price liberalization took place, the CPI and PPI
rose 159% and 383% (per month) respectively. This peak is not shown on the graph to keep all other
peaks visible.
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1.7.1 Table A1. Descriptive macroeconomic statistics
1995 1999 2003 2007
GDP growth, % p.a. -10.4 3.4 7.0 8.2
PPI, % p.a. 117.6 245.0 28.1 17.2
CPI, % p.a. 244.0 251.2 25.4 12.1
Market exchange rate, BYR per USD, mid-year 11.5 542.5 2,045 2,140
Exchange rate change, % p.a. 37.6 142.7 12.4 0.3
Average wage, USD 65.2 40.4 123.5 323.0
Registered unemployment,
percentage of economically active population 2.2 2.1 3.3 1.2
Source: IPM Research Center (Minsk, Belarus; http://www.research.by); the National Statistical
Committee of the Republic of Belarus.
Note: For gures in USD, the market exchange rate is used.
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Table A2. Decile shares of income, %
decile group 1995 1999 2003 2007
bottom 10% 4.1 3.1 3.6 4.1
2 6.0 6.1 6.0 5.7
3 6.9 7.1 7.0 6.8
4 7.8 8.0 7.9 7.7
5 8.6 8.9 8.8 8.6
6 9.5 9.8 9.7 9.5
7 10.6 10.8 10.7 10.6
8 12.0 12.1 12.1 12.1
9 14.0 14.0 14.2 14.4
top 10% 20.5 20.1 20.0 20.6
Table A3. Decile shares of expenditure, %
decile group 1995 1999 2003 2007
bottom 10% 3.1 3.0 3.4 3.7
2 4.8 4.7 5.2 5.2
3 5.9 5.8 6.3 6.4
4 7.0 6.9 7.3 7.3
5 8.2 8.0 8.3 8.3
6 9.4 9.2 9.3 9.4
7 10.7 10.6 10.7 10.6
8 12.6 12.5 12.3 12.2
9 15.2 15.3 15.0 14.8
top 10% 23.3 24.1 22.2 22.1
Source: Authors own calculations based on the BHBS.





Second agriculture in Belarus and Ukraine:
subsistence or leisure?1
Abstract
In many post-Soviet countries, more than half of all urban households use small
land plots to produce signicant agricultural output even though their members have
paid jobs or collect state pensions. Existing studies suggest that in Russia such second
agriculturehelps smooth consumption during times of economic uncertainty. Using
household budget survey data, I study the role of second agriculturein Belarus and
Ukraine, two countries that di¤er signicantly in the coverage of their social safety
nets. I nd that in both countries most urban households use their small land plots
for leisure, and since the mid-1990s, they tend to move away from this activity. The
Ukrainian urban poor indeed use the second agricultureto substitute for the lack of
social transfers, while in Belarus the poor are better covered and for them it is more
of a leisure activity.
Keywords: Belarus, Ukraine, transition, social security, second agriculture, small
land plots, consumption smoothing
JEL classication: D13, H55, I32, I38, J43, Q12
1I wish to thank my advisor tµepán Jurajda for motivation, valuable comments, and
helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank Tom Coupé, Randall K. Filer, Lubomir
Lizal, and Alina Verashchagina for their useful and pertinent comments. I am also very
grateful to the Belarusian Statistical Committee and the IPM Research Center (Minsk,
Belarus) for the data they provided. The purchase of the data was funded by Charles
University GAUK grant 257602 (project 60207). All errors remaining in this text are
the responsibility of the author.
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2.1 Introduction
In times of economic uncertainty that are characterized, among others, by high ination
and real price adjustment periods, formal social safety nets in less developed countries
often fail to provide adequate coverage, so people have to turn to various informal
mechanisms of insuring their consumption levels. One of these mechanisms is known
as the second agriculture.2 In many transition countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, more than half of all households are involved in
this second agriculture3, and this activity is widely spread not only among rural (as
in the developing countries), but among urban households as well. Existing studies,
which are mainly focused on Russia, suggest two main reasons for the existence of
second agriculturein transition countries: (1) it serves as a consumption smoothing
mechanism during the times of economic crises to complement or sometimes even
substitute for the ine¢ cient formal social security systems and (2) it is a cultural and
historical phenomenon (this includes all non-economic reasons to use small land plots).
Unfortunately, there is almost no research on second agriculture and its e¤ect
on poverty or inequality in post-Soviet countries other than in Russia, mainly due
to the lack of suitable data. This gap in the research is important as post-Soviet
governments often di¤er dramatically in their ability to provide income insurance and
social guarantees to their citizens. A case in point is the comparison of Belarus and
Ukraine: two countries that have tight economic, historical, and cultural links and
have started their transition from very similar initial conditions, but have had quite
di¤erent transition paths, including the social security systems they have built. A
2The second agriculture is the home production of food on small land plots, as opposed to the
rst industrial - agriculture that is large-scale agricultural production for the market. It is also
called independent agriculture, individual agriculture, subsistence agriculture, household agriculture;
family farming ; home gardening, agricultural home production, and household food production. The
parcels of land used in the process are called small land plots, household plots, personal subsidiary
plots, home gardens, garden plots, private plots, plots of rural households (LPH), and dachas, gathered
together in subsidiary farms or horticultural associations.
3My estimates from Belarusian and Ukrainian Households Budget Surveys show that approximately
two-thirds of all households use small land plots in those countries, which is consistent with the
data provided by the national statistical o¢ ces. In Russia, according to the Goskomstat (the State
Statistical Committee of Russia), this gure is lower but still greater than 50%.
44
World Bank (2007) country brief characterizes Belarus as having a ...comprehensive
social security and good basic health and education services [that] have been sustained
since independence and remain available. In Ukraine, on the other hand, the set
of government transfers still require better coverage of [sic] the poor and [a] better
targeting of transfers... (p. XVIII) There are major gaps in terms of coverage and
targeting of the poor(World Bank, 2005, p. 49). These di¤erences in social security
systems could imply that second agriculture plays di¤erent roles in Belarus and
Ukraine, providing more consumption-smoothing insurance in Ukraine, where social
safety nets are less comprehensive. However, the general evolution of the share of
urban households that use small land plots suggests otherwise.
Figure 2.1. The share of urban households that use small land
































Source: Authors own calculations based on the Belarusian and Ukrainian Household Budget
Surveys (the BHBS and the UHBS).
Belarus and Ukraine have roughly the same share of urban households that use4
4They can own or rent them, though neither Belarus nor Ukraine has a real market for (agricultural)
land. Numerous obstacles, mostly administrative, prevent land plots from being sold and bought freely.
It is especially di¢ cult to convertthe land dened as agriculturalto any other use.
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small land plots (SLPs thereafter) and this share goes down with time, as Figure 2.1
shows. Almost all rural households (97-98%) use SLPs and this gure does not change
over the years. However for the poor, the e¤ect of social transfers on SLPs is di¤erent:5
in Ukraine the correlation is negative, meaning that SLPs are used as a substitute for
the gaps in social security. In Belarus it is positive, implying that the poor use the
income from SLPs to complement other sources of income and for leisure.
In this essay, I use household budget surveys from Belarus and Ukraine to quantify
and explain the roles of the second agriculture in both countries. The structure of
the essay is as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the literature; Section 2.3 describes the data
used; Section 2.4 discusses the results, and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
There is extensive literature on livelihood sustainability and consumption smoothing
under conditions of economic uncertainty. This literature (including Rosenzweig, 1988;
Deaton, 1989 and 1992; Paxson, 1992 and 1993; Townsend, 1995; Udry, 1995; Ersado,
2006; Kazianga and Udry, 2006; and many others) concludes that most households try
to avoid extended periods of dependence on only one source of income, suggesting that
income diversication is the key way of ex ante (e.g. self-insurance against risks in
the context of missing insurance and credit markets) or ex post (e.g. extra jobs taken
on to make up for the decline in income) risk management for those households that
anticipate or face adverse economic conditions. This literature is especially large for
developing countries, and it mostly focuses on rural areas, estimating the share and
explaining the signicance of non-farm income.
There are also studies of consumption smoothing and social safety nets in Russia6
5Yet another di¤erence between Belarus and Ukraine is that in Belarus, second agriculture appears
to have an equalizing e¤ect. The inequality of income and expenditure is almost always higher among
the households who do not use small land plots than among those who do. The di¤erences are the
biggest during the crisis of 1998, when small land plots seem to have had an equalizing e¤ect. In
Ukraine, SLPs have a much higher contribution to total inequality 25% versus only 6% in Belarus
in 2002 (see the rst chapter of this dissertation, published as a CERGE-EI WP in 2008).
6To my knowledge there are no analogous, or even similar, studies for the post-Soviet countries
other than Russia probably because such very rich data sets as the RLMS do not exist for the other
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(e.g. Lokshin and Ravallion, 2000; Buckley, Cartwright, Struyk, and Szymanoski, 2003;
Lokshin and Yemtsov, 2004; and others) and in some Central and Eastern Europe
countries (Kostov and Lingard, 2002; Mathijs and Noev, 2004).
Kostov and Lingard (2002) study subsistence agriculture in Bulgaria. They nd
that its existence is largely non-commercial, but of what they call a general economic
nature (p. 93) due to a long tradition of the household food self-su¢ ciency (p.
91). They argue for creating mechanisms to increase the market orientation (that
already existed before the transition) and the market e¢ ciency of SLPs, and to speed
up the process of their commercialization. Mathijs and Noev (2004) study SLPs in
Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. They also look for explanations of why
these small-scale farms are virtually not included in the market. They nd that social
security systems would play a key role in solving the subsistence problem, but again
improvements in the land markets are necessary in all four countries.
Studies of the e¤ect of the 1998 crisis in Russia on the Russian population nd that
SLPs did play a role as a consumption smoothing mechanism. Gerry and Li (2007)
and Stillman (2001) estimate models of consumption smoothing in Russia. They nd
that home production does play an important insurance role for the poorest and most
vulnerable households. Southworth (2006) asserts that in Russia, SLPs are more of a
survival mechanism than a leisure activity of the rich. He shows that urban households
turn to home agricultural production in times of economic uncertainty and that their
SLPs are protable. Lokshin and Yemtsov (2004) conrm that Russian households
increased their home agricultural production during the crisis. However, they also nd
that many of the poor did not use SLPs at all, and households from a higher decile
seemed to use their land more (mainly because owning land is expensive). Notten and
de Neubourg (2007) conrm the role of SLPs as a consumption smoothing mechanism
but do not nd any di¤erences in agricultural home production across income quantiles.
They explain this nding by cultural aspects (such as preferences on leisure activities)
and by the suggestion that SLPs in Russia are used more as an income smoothing
countries of the region.
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strategy as opposed to a specic risk/shock response strategy(p. 41).
These papers nd that the Russians tend not to rely much on the government in
times of economic uncertainty. Lokshin and Yemtsov (2004) quote the survey data
from the 1990s, where only 4-5% of households would primarily rely for help in need
on the state social security. A partial explanation for this result is arrears in payment
of government transfers (including pensions), very prevalent in Russia in the 1990s but
virtually non-existent in Belarus. Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) document that while
on average government transfers fell by 18% between 1996 and 1998, their targeting
improved.
Some other articles consider second agriculture in the former Soviet Union as
mainly a cultural phenomenon. This stream of (mostly sociological) articles includes
Wegren (1994, 1996); Buckley and Gurenko (1997); Io¤e and Nefedova (1998); White
(2000); Lovell (2002); Koenker (2003); and Zavisca (2003). Their main premise is that
SLPs in the former USSR are used mostly for leisure.
My contribution to these streams of literature is not only in studying countries
not previously described in the literature, but also in contrasting the roles of second
agriculturein two countries with quite di¤erent social safety nets.
2.3 Data
The data used for this essay are pooled cross-sections from annual household budget
surveys: the Belarusian Household Budget Survey (BHBS) from 1995 to 2008 and the
Ukrainian Household Budget Survey (UHBS) from 1999 to 2007, obtained from the na-
tional statistical o¢ ces of both countries. Since both household budget surveys use the
same methodology, the data are su¢ ciently comparable. Each cross-section contains
approximately 5000 (for Belarus) or 9000 observations (for Ukraine) representative of
the population of the respective country. Each observation includes detailed informa-
tion about the household and its members; a breakdown of income and expenditures by
categories; detailed data on food consumption; and information about their dwellings.
The data on income and expenditure are monthly averages for a given year. They are
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collected quarterly using a diary completed by household and survey questions asked
by interviewers.
These are arguably the best datasets to study and compare di¤erent aspects of
income and consumption in Belarus and Ukraine. However, for the purposes of this
research the data have some drawbacks:
(1) We cannot follow the same households over time and observe the changes in use
of individual SLPs.
(2) For those people who work for wages, there is no information on whether they
are employed by a state-owned or a private enterprise.
(3) There is no information on hours worked either on the SLPs or on the main
jobs.7
(4) There is no data on the size of the SLPs, only the number of them (if a household
uses more than one).
(5) The survey in Ukraine started only in 1999; there is no pre-crisis data.
Nevertheless, these household budget surveys data are the best available for Belarus
and Ukraine; they are su¢ cient to reach meaningful conclusions.
The descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 2.1.A and 2.1.B.
7Such data exist, but the Belarusian statistical o¢ ce decided not to make them available to outside
researchers.
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Table 2.1.A Descriptive statistics, Belarus
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Residence: city 150346 0.32 0.47 0 1
Residence: capital 150346 0.13 0.34 0 1
Male HH head 150346 0.52 0.50 0 1
Age of the HH head 150346 49.32 14.25 18 99
HH head - Incomplete 150346 0.19 0.39 0 1
secondary education or less
HH head - Higher (university) 150346 0.17 0.37 0 1
education or more
Blue-collar worker HH head 150346 0.40 0.49 0 1
Retired HH head 150346 0.21 0.41 0 1
Unemployed HH head 150346 0.02 0.14 0 1
Self-employed HH head 150346 0.03 0.16 0 1
Wages 150346 112900.7 119689.9 0 1136774
Self-employment income 150346 4748.73 28196.87 0 1062891
Pensions 150346 28533.65 45911.16 0 509543.9
Social support 150346 3149.77 10280.19 0 325238.7
Assistance received by HH 150346 6762.55 19631 0 1138482
Male 150346 0.41 0.49 0 1
Age 150346 45.23 17.44 18 129
Incomplete secondary 150346 0.20 0.40 0 1
education or less
Higher (university) 137651 0.16 0.37 0 1
education or more
Source: Authors own calculations based on the Belarusian Household Budget Survey (the BHBS).
Note: All income variables are in Belarusian roubles and on the household level, normalized using
CPI and the base year 2000.
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Table 2.1.B Descriptive statistics, Ukraine
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Residence: city 150770 0.31 0.46 0 1
Residence: capital 150770 0.04 0.20 0 1
Male HH head 150770 0.48 0.50 0 1
Age of the HH head 150770 54.18 15.89 18 101
HH head - Incomplete 150746 0.26 0.44 0 1
secondary education or less
HH head - Higher (university) 149435 0.17 0.37 0 1
education or more
Blue-collar worker HH head 150770 0.47 0.37 0 1
Retired HH head 150770 0.21 0.41 0 1
Unemployed HH head 150770 0.04 0.21 0 1
Self-employed HH head 150770 0.05 0.50 0 1
Wages 150770 3545.16 5770.61 0 194465.6
Self-employment income 150770 382.82 2803.30 0 351255.8
Pensions 150770 1881.08 2772.42 0 45195.6
Social support 150770 158.76 684.65 0 30796.8
Assistance received by HH 127332 487.41 1586.20 0 124000
Male 150770 0.42 0.49 0 1
Age 149674 48.30 17.92 18 106
Incomplete secondary 150770 0.15 0.36 0 1
education or less
Higher (university) 140922 0.16 0.37 0 1
education or more
Source: Authors own calculations based on the Ukrainian Household Budget Survey (the UHBS).
Note: All income variables are in hryvnyas and at the household level, normalized using CPI and
the base year 2000.
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2.4 Small land plots in Belarus and Ukraine
This section is structured as follows. First in Section 2.4.1, I consider the e¤ect of
the 1998 Russian crisis on income and consumption in Belarus and Ukraine and the
role of the government in alleviating the crisis. In Section 2.4.2, I present the general
evolution of SLP usage in Belarus and Ukraine over the years. Then in Section 2.4.3,
I study the e¤ect of various factors on SLP usage among the urban poor. Finally in
Section 2.4.4, I analyze the consumption-smoothing role of SLPs.
2.4.1 Income and consumption after the crisis of 1998
Before considering second agriculture in Belarus and Ukraine, I need to give some
details that will help to see the full extent of the 1998 Russian crisis and its e¤ect on
income and consumption in the two countries.
Figure 2.2. Average income and food consumption in Belarus

















Source: Authors own calculations based on the BHBS and the UHBS.
The crisis noticeably reduced the average income, but the poor were hit the hardest:
in Belarus, their income went down three times, from 63 USD per month per household
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to only 21 USD.8 While for Ukraine the HBS data exist only from 1999 onwards,
the situation there was similar, except Ukrainians had on average lower income than
Belarusians, while spending virtually the same amounts of money on food. This higher
share of food expenditures is another sign that Ukrainians are poorer on average.9
The share of income going for food consumption that for the bottom deciles was
already large (around 60-70%), skyrocketed during the crisis, exceeding 120% for the
bottom decile in 1998-1999, meaning that the Belarusian poor did not have enough
income even to cover their food expenditures, so they had to borrow or sell their assets.
(Another explanation could be an increase in the shadow economy, not present in
the o¢ cial data, including in the household budget surveys.) In Ukrainem the situation
was even worse: not only the bottom but even the second decile had to borrow to buy
food up until 2004. The e¤ect of the 1998 crisis on Ukraine in general and on the
Ukrainian poor in particular was lasting much longer than in Belarus.
The social support10 in Belarus was not adequate during this time, though it was
better targeted on the poor than the pensions.11 In Ukraine this support was virtually
nonexistent, but pensions were relatively more generous. While government support
relative to food expenditure was increasing over the years, especially for the bottom
decile (both in Belarus and in Ukraine), during the crisis of 1998 it did not play any
signicant role the state was not helping the poor to cover their food consumption.
Overall, government transfers in Belarus seem to be more or less adequately targeted
on the poor, but still they did not help them su¢ ciently during the crisis of 1998. In
Ukraine they did not help at all.
The crisis also widened the income gap between the poorest and the richest in
Belarus. In 1998 and 1999, the bottom decile of Belarusians received more than 10
8The market exchange rate was used to convert all numbers from local currencies into USD.
9Inequality in Ukraine is much higher than in Belarus see the rst chapter of this dissertation.
10I dene it as the sum of all government transfers except pensions because the latter are covered by
separate legislation in both countries. Pensions are usually paid in full and without arrears because
the retired tend to take part in elections very actively, so the governments of post-Soviet countries try
not to disappointthis part of their electorate.
11Pensions (at least in the developed countries of Western Europe) are meant to be a type of social
support as State provides some kind of minimal income/services to those who are unable to earn it
on their own, e.g. because they are too old to work.
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p.p. less income (relative to the top decile) than in 1997. In Ukraine, the gap was
even wider, almost reaching 85% in 1999. For the second and the third decile, the gap
stayed virtually constant during these years, again pointing to the fact that the crisis
of 1998 was particularly di¢ cult for the poorest.
2.4.2 General evolution over the years
The evolution of Belarusian and Ukrainian data related to small land plots over the
years of transition show some interesting patterns.
While the share of all households using small land plots decreases by 10 p.p. from
almost 70% from 1995 to 2008 in Belarus and from 1999 to 2007 in Ukraine, virtually
all (97-98%) rural households use small land plots and this share does not change over
the years. The most plausible explanation is that di¤erent mechanisms12 work for
urban and rural households in this case. Because of these di¤erences, in the remaining
of this section, I will follow only urban households, unless explicitly noted otherwise.
Both capitals, Minsk of Belarus and Kiev of Ukraine, have the lowest shares of
households using small land plots (not more than 35%). Other large cities have a
higher share (from 40% to 46%), while in small towns it is the highest (from 58% to
73%). Based on Figure 2.1, it may seem that contrary to the predictions of the literature
on consumption smoothing, this share decreased in Belarus in 1998 the year of the
Russian nancial crisis that was a major hit to the Belarusian economy, but because
of timing this is not true. The crisis started in August 1998, when that years crop
had already been planted and almost completely harvested, so no adjustments could
be made and the decrease of SLP use in 1998 in Belarus should be attributed to some
downward trend from previous years. In 1999 the share went up, in full accordance with
the consumption smoothing premise. The lack of pre-1999 data on Ukraine does not
permit one to check whether the same is true for Ukraine as well, but this hypothesis
will be testable when (or if) the UHBS data for 2009 and 2010 become available.
12In both countries, almost all rural people work in collective farms, or kolkhozes the rst agri-
culture, so on their SLPs they perform the same activities as at their usual jobs, while all urban
workers have jobs other than in agriculture.
54
While Minsk has the lowest share of households that use small land plots, the
inhabitants of Minsk mainly own them, while in other cities and towns households
tend to rent instead. In 1998-1999, the share of renters went down in Minsk, which,
combined with the overall decrease of small land plot use, would mean that during the
crisis those who rented their small land plots were more likely to give them up.
Figure 2.3. The share of urban households that use SLPs in
Belarus and Ukraine by income deciles
Source: Authors own calculations based on the BHBS and the UHBS.
While the inhabitants of bigger cities, who in both countries are richer than their
compatriots, tend to use SLPs less, the direct relationship between the income and
the use of SLPs is the other way round. Figure 2.3 shows that in Belarus it actually
goes up with income (in Ukraine the connection is less clear, it changes in the opposite
directions for the rich and for the poor).
2.4.3 SLP usage among the urban population
As there can be at least two reasons for a household to use an SLP, one needs a way
to distinguish them. The data from both budget surveys contain a variable How is
the plot (rst one) mostly used?. Unfortunately, it is not very informative as almost
all households have chosen the answer Grow food not for sale (for family).
To be able to distinguish the di¤erent purposes of SLPs, I estimate the following
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model for all urban individuals older than 18 in Belarus and Ukraine, controlling for






jj + "ijt; (2.1)
where slp is the dummy variable = 1 if the household uses a small land plot and
= 0 otherwise, t is year, j is region, and X includes various explanatory variables.13
The regression gives the following coe¢ cients.14
13Many otherwise relevant characteristics of the household, e.g. the number of children or the
number of earners, are correlated with the amount of social transfers and other income variables, so
they have to be excluded to avoid multicollinearity.
14I speak only about the signs of the e¤ects because the coe¢ cients themselves vary too greatly for
any meaningful conclusions from their values.
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Table 2.2.A The e¤ect of various factors on the propensity to
use SLPs in Belarus by income deciles, 1995-2008 (SLP, probit,
urban households, age18)
Variable deciles 1-2 deciles 3-4 deciles 5-6 deciles 7-8 deciles 9-10
Residence: city -0.712*** -0.726*** -0.698*** -0.569*** -0.525***
Residence: capital -1.399*** 1.77 -1.137*** -1.049*** 2.1
Male HH head 0.121*** 0.048** 0.032 0.016 0.03
Age of the HH head (*1000) 47.310*** 65.219*** 99.703*** 93.247*** 105.329***
Age of the HH head -0.369*** -0.464*** -0.760*** -0.717*** -0.796***
squared (*1000)
HH head - Incomplete 0.084 0.017 -0.072 -0.093* -0.042
secondary education or less
HH head - Higher (university) 0.133** 0.062 -0.056 -0.013 0.105***
education or more
Blue-collar worker HH head -0.152*** -0.083*** -0.046 -0.146*** -0.167***
Retired HH head -0.089* -0.224*** -0.093** 0.016 -0.012
Unemployed HH head -0.201*** -0.044 0.023 -0.222** -0.182**
Self-employed HH head -0.087 0.007 -0.011 -0.14 -0.258***
Wages (*1000000) 1.723*** 2.948*** 1.311*** 1.644*** 1.525***
Self-employment income 2.322*** 2.907*** 1.557** 2.290*** 1.269***
(*1000000)
Pensions (*1000000) 3.811*** 5.713*** 6.269*** 3.774*** 3.118***
Social support (*1000000) 0.177 2.960*** 2.441** 0.657 -0.043
Assistance received 1.574 -0.096 -1.132 1.037 -1.226***
by HH (*1000000)
Male 0.034 0.044* 0.058** 0.048** 0.060***
Age (*1000) 3.399 6.668 8.167* 13.239*** 4.381
Age squared (*1000) -0.021 -0.068 -0.102** -0.093* -0.006
Incomplete secondary 0.079 0.072 0.064 -0.015 0.011
education or less
Higher (university) 0.017 0.016 0.079** 0.033 0.011
education or more
Year e¤ect yes yes yes yes yes
Region e¤ect yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 12023 17699 16934 14603 20925
Pseudo R-squared 0.113 0.254 0.165 0.138 0.243
Source: Authors own calculations based on the Belarusian Household Budget Survey (the BHBS).
CPI data from the BelStat.
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. HH = household. All income variables are at the
household level, normalized using CPI and the base year 2000.
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Table 2.2.B The e¤ect of various factors on the propensity to
use SLPs in Ukraine by income deciles, 1999-2007 (SLP, probit,
urban households, age18)
Variable deciles 1-2 deciles 3-4 deciles 5-6 deciles 7-8 deciles 9-10
Residence: city -1.120*** -1.072*** -1.216*** -1.297*** -1.477***
Residence: capital -3.026*** -2.298*** -2.228*** -2.577*** -2.722***
Male HH head 0.368*** 0.207*** 0.182*** 0.244*** 0.104***
Age of the HH head (*1000) 13.166*** 49.342*** 48.984*** 49.429*** 71.030***
Age of the HH head 0.024 -0.266*** -0.314*** -0.313*** -0.561***
squared (*1000)
HH head - Incomplete 0.183*** 0.238*** 0.424*** 0.402*** 0.591***
secondary education or less
HH head - Higher (university) -0.099*** -0.083*** -0.008 -0.235*** -0.309***
education or more
Blue-collar worker HH head -0.210*** -0.280*** -0.029 -0.195*** -0.191***
Retired HH head -0.165*** -0.244*** -0.067 -0.112 -0.136**
Unemployed HH head -0.140** -0.256*** -0.197** -0.144* 0.001
Self-employed HH head -0.136** -0.233*** -0.06 -0.189*** -0.151***
Wages (*1000) -0.208*** -0.393*** -0.289*** -0.177*** -0.013***
Self-employment income -0.356*** -0.419*** -0.198*** -0.181*** -0.010***
(*1000)
Pensions (*1000) -0.228*** -0.426*** -0.274*** -0.182*** 0.006*
Social support (*1000) -0.386*** -0.320*** -0.192*** -0.140*** 0.01
Assistance received -0.455*** -0.637*** -0.382*** -0.235*** -0.023***
by HH (*1000)
Male 0.006 -0.02 -0.002 0.008 0.014
Age (*1000) 2.186 -1.4 6.615 -2.493 10.605***
Age squared (*1000) -0.019 0.008 -0.065 0.019 -0.086**
Incomplete secondary 0.093** 0.04 0.100** -0.069 0.03
education or less
Higher (university) 0.01 -0.096*** -0.056* -0.027 -0.059**
education or more
Year e¤ect yes yes yes yes yes
Region e¤ect yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 24036 24076 23811 24532 24093
Pseudo R-squared 0.264 0.327 0.372 0.401 0.374
Source: Authors own calculations based on the Ukrainian Household Budget Surveys (the UHBS).
CPI data from the UkrStat.
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. HH = household. All income variables are at the
household level, normalized using CPI and the base year 2000.
58
In both countries, the age, gender, and education of an individual have relatively
less importance for the use of SLPs (the coe¢ cients are almost always non-signicant)
than the age, gender, and education of the household head because the decision of
using an SLP is made at the household, not the individual level.15 If the head is male,
the household is more likely to use an SLP (think of single mothers that have no time,
money nor other resources for second agriculture). The relationship with the age of
the head has an inverted-Ushape. In Ukraine, less educated people are more likely
to live in a household with an SLP; on the other hand, households with white-collar
workers as head are more likely to use SLPs than other households. In Belarus, most
of the coe¢ cients on education and socio-economic status variables are not signicant.
Those living in big cities tend to use SLPs less than those from small towns, the
residents of the capitals, even less. Various factors could explain this. For the subsis-
tence use of SLPs, it is the distance to reach the plot which is the larger for bigger
cities. For leisure use, it is the wider choice and availability of other leisure activities
in bigger cities.
The variables of the most interest are various sources of income. Note that in Be-
larus they are correlated positively and in Ukraine negatively (almost all of them), but
not all of the coe¢ cients are signicant. Social transfers are correlated negatively with
SLPs in Ukraine, and the coe¢ cients decrease with the increase of income, meaning
that the Ukrainian poor use second agriculture as a substitute for insu¢ cient social
security. This is further conrmed by a positive (and relatively large) coe¢ cient for
the assistance received from relatives and friends. In Belarus, the coe¢ cient at social
transfers is positive, meaning that in Belarus, SLPs are more of a leisure activity, than
of subsistence, even for the poor. As for the coe¢ cient for assistance, it is statistically
non-signicant for the Belarusian poor.
15In addititon, household members usually share their food and use their dwellings together.
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2.4.4 Small land plots and consumption smoothing
SLPs provide a unique opportunity to households to grow their own food, thus re-
ducing their vulnerability vis-a-vis macroeconomic shocks. Their role decreases with
income and with time: in the 1990s in Belarus, up to 60% of the food consumption
of households in the bottom quintile (almost 75% for the bottom decile) was covered
by the crop from the small land plots (for those households that use them). By the
middle of the 2000s, this share was cut by half. For the richest quintile, it went down
from 50% to almost 20%.
In Ukraine this share was already lower in 1999 (for all quintiles), and since then
it went down signicantly. Note that for the poor, the share is actually lower than for
the rich (in Belarus it is vice versa).
It should be noted that in Belarus for the bottom quintile (deciles d1 and d2) the
importance of SLPs for food consumption went down abruptly from year 1998 to 1999.
The crisis struck in August 1998, when the current years crops were almost completely
harvested. The poor did not increase their use of SLPs in 1998; quite the contrary,
they reduced it. On the other hand, the use of SLPs went down for all quintiles in 1998
and up again in 1999 (Figure 2.1). It looks like the poor who already had SLPs when
the crisis struck used them very heavily or at least as usual, but for the next year,
the share of households using SLPs increased (consistent with consumption smoothing
behavior); at the same time, the output of the SLPs went down (probably because the
households could not invest enough).
The importance of SLPs is higher for richer Ukrainians than for the poor, but
only until the mid-2000s; after 2004, this importance is now the same for all quantiles
(quintiles or deciles). This result means that urban households with SLPs get signicant
output from them, which is consistent with the nding reported in the rst chapter of
this dissertation: In 2002, income from small land plots contributed 25.2% to the total
inequality in Ukraine (10.5 Gini points) and only 6.3% in Belarus (1.5 Gini points).
To study the e¤ect of various factors on the importance of SLPs for food consump-
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tion, I estimate the following model for all city-dwellers older than 18 in Belarus and






jj + "ijt; (2.2)
where ilp_vs_food is dened as the income from SLPs16 (both in natural produce
and monetary form) divided by the expenditure on food, t is year, j is region and X
include various explanatory variables. (Many characteristics of the household, e.g. the
number of children or the number of earners, are correlated with the social transfers
and other income variables, so they have to be excluded, as in the previous sub-section.)
The coe¢ cients obtained from the regression are presented in the following table.
16Naturally for the households that do not use SLPs, this income will be zero, so the Tobit model
is used.
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Table 2.3.A The e¤ect of various factors on the relative impor-
tance of income from SLPs for food consumption in Belarus
by income deciles, 1995-2008 (ILP vs. food expenditure, tobit,
urban households, age18)
Variable deciles 1-2 deciles 3-4 deciles 5-6 deciles 7-8 deciles 9-10
Residence: city -0.201*** -0.178*** -0.173*** -0.151*** -0.190***
Residence: capital -0.262 -0.269*** -0.253*** -0.208 -0.256***
Male HH head 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.003 0.011** 0.034***
Age of the HH head (*1000) -3.042* 1.215 1.771 0.751 -0.432
Age of the HH head 0.009 -0.024* -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.032
squared (*1000)
HH head - Incomplete -0.006 0.008 -0.006 -0.002 0.086***
secondary education or less
HH head - Higher (university) 0.009 -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.008 -0.005
education or more
Blue-collar worker HH head -0.016* -0.002 -0.018*** -0.028*** -0.009
Retired HH head -0.054*** -0.094*** -0.026*** 0.051*** 0.105***
Unemployed HH head 0.070*** 0.037** 0.043** 0.074*** 0.015
Self-employed HH head -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.082*** -0.068*** -0.166***
Wages (*1000000) -0.431*** -0.343*** -0.262*** -0.271*** -0.228***
Self-employment income (*1000000) -0.656*** -0.294* -0.294** -0.212* 0.024
Pensions (*1000000) -0.565*** -0.556*** -0.178*** -0.153** -0.214**
Social support (*1000000) 0.394 1.899*** 1.538*** 0.605** 0.518
Assistance received 1.988*** 1.265*** 0.829*** 0.818*** 0.454***
by HH (*1000000)
Male 0.014* 0.014*** 0.008* 0.013** 0.008
Age (*1000) 2.689* -0.255 -0.259 1.997* -0.416
Age squared (*1000) -0.038** -0.006 -0.01 -0.028*** 0.002
Incomplete secondary -0.012 -0.019* 0.008 0.017 0.025
education or less
Higher (university) -0.022 -0.007 -0.001 -0.004 0.009
education or more
Year e¤ect yes yes yes yes yes
Region e¤ect yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 12029 17699 16934 14618 20925
Pseudo R-squared 0.175 0.25 0.384 0.297 0.078
Source: Authors own calculations based on the Belarusian Household Budget Survey (the BHBS).
CPI data from the BelStat.
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. HH = household. All income variables are at the
household level, normalized using CPI and the base year 2000.
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Table 2.3.B The e¤ect of various factors on the relative impor-
tance of income from SLPs for food consumption in Ukraine
by income deciles, 1999-2007 (ILP vs. food expenditure, tobit,
urban households, age18)
Variable deciles 1-2 deciles 3-4 deciles 5-6 deciles 7-8 deciles 9-10
Residence: city -1.761*** -0.194 -0.087 3.327*** 1.106***
Residence: capital -4.689*** -0.744 1.904*** 7.455*** 6.005***
Male HH head 1.595*** 1.717*** 0.947*** 4.504*** 0.458**
Age of the HH head (*1000) 10.165 56.596*** 240.964*** 955.303*** 148.955***
Age of the HH head -0.068 -0.197 -2.058*** -7.565*** -1.289***
squared (*1000)
HH head - Incomplete 1.127*** 1.774*** 3.594*** 19.362*** 4.252***
secondary education or less
HH head - Higher (univ.) 0.767*** 1.557*** 2.635*** 10.196*** 1.459***
education or more
Blue-collar worker HH head -0.38 -0.843*** -0.916*** -5.473*** -1.370***
Retired HH head 0.271 0.085 -0.041 -6.212*** -0.724
Unemployed HH head -1.109*** -2.297*** -2.787*** -12.958*** -1.969***
Self-employed HH head -0.763*** -1.102*** -0.835*** -5.747*** -0.978***
Wages (*1000) -1.822*** -2.010*** -1.494*** -2.969*** -0.259***
Self-employment income (*1000) -1.678*** -2.288*** -1.642*** -3.039*** -0.296***
Pensions (*1000) -3.788*** -4.301*** -3.486*** -7.519*** -0.857***
Social support (*1000) -2.915*** -3.025*** -3.314*** -3.776*** -0.057
Assistance received -3.934*** -3.341*** -2.078*** -4.147*** -0.325***
by HH (*1000)
Male 0.194** 0.019 0.455*** 0.308 0.003
Age (*1000) 4.672 -40.892** -27.661 -304.248*** -24.698
Age squared (*1000) -0.213 0.15 0.223 2.745** 0.27
Incomplete secondary -0.310* -0.354* -0.543** -3.097*** -0.923***
education or less
Higher (university) -0.019 0.474*** 0.032 0.506 -0.078
education or more
Year e¤ect yes yes yes yes yes
Region e¤ect yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 24036 24076 23811 24532 24093
Pseudo R-squared 0.04 0.095 0.139 0.144 0.309
Source: Authors own calculations based on the Ukrainian Household Budget Survey (the UHBS).
CPI data from the UkrStat.
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. HH = household. All income variables are at the
household level, normalized using CPI and the base year 2000.
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Similar to SLP use, age and education of individual household members have little
importance for the importance of SLPs for food consumption, relative to age and
education of the household head, especially in Belarus. Again, the relationship with
age is shaped as an inverted-U. In Ukraine, those with less education are using
their SLPs more heavily, with a higher importance on food consumption. As for
the socio-economic status of the household head, the importance is the highest for the
unemployed.
The correlation of ilp_vs_food with wages, self-employment income, and pensions
is negative in both countries, while for social support and assistance from relatives
and friends in Belarus it is positive, again implying that their SLPs are not used as a
substitute for social security. In Ukraine it is negative, meaning exactly the opposite,
especially for the poor, for whom the coe¢ cients are the largest.
My overall conclusion would be that relative to Ukraine, in Belarus, SLPs are more
of a leisure activity than a consumption smoothing mechanism, even for the poor. In
Ukraine for the poor, the use of SLPs for subsistence is relatively more widespread
mainly because of insu¢ cient social transfers, while the rich gradually move away from
this as a leisure activity.
2.5 Conclusions
Using data from the Ukrainian and Belarusian Household Budget Surveys (the UHBS
and BHBS), I nd that in both countries many of the rich use their small land plots for
leisure, but they gradually switch away from this activity. As for the poor in Ukraine,
some use SLP as a substitute for insu¢ cient social transfers, while others cannot a¤ord
them at all. In Belarus, the situation is less dramatic as the poor use the income from
SLPs to complement other sources of income.
Compared to Russia, where government transfers did not play a signicant role in
the 1990s because of payment arrears but whose targeting was improved during the
crisis, the poor in Belarus did not get much help from the state in 1998-1999 (this
could be one of the reasons that prevented them from using of SLPs more widely for
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consumption smoothing), and in Ukraine the state was virtually completely absent.
Paying state subsidies to the poor to run their SLPs could be a way to help them
cope with the crisis as this assistance would provide them with both an occupation
and some insurance towards their food consumption.
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Evidence from the Chernobyl accident: the
e¤ect on schooling, labor market and health
outcomes in Belarus1
Abstract
The Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986 had deleterious health consequences for
the population of Belarus in particular, thyroid malignancies, especially for children
below 4 years of age at the time of the disaster. This essay utilizes the natural ex-
periment generated by this accident, which produced a sizable increase in radiation
levels in several regions of Belarus irrelative of any other factors. Using the 2001-2008
waves of the Belarusian Household Budget Survey, we estimate the e¤ect of radiation
on schooling, labor market and health outcomes among the cohorts and regions that
varied in the amount of exposure. We nd that younger children coming from the more
contaminated regions had more job-related health issues and lower wages than those
who were older at the time of the accident or who came from the less contaminated
regions. While we do not nd an e¤ect on education, this absence could be caused by
special privileges for the applicants from the contaminated regions.
Keywords: Chernobyl, Belarus, schooling, education, cognitive, wage, income,
employment
JEL classication: I18, I20, Q53, J24
1The authors would like to thank tµepán Jurajda, Kateryna Bornukova, Randall K.
Filer, Lubomir Lizal, Alina Verashchagina, and the participants of the seminar at BEROC




In less than 20 years of its modern history, the Republic of Belarus experienced several
major external shocks that had a serious impact on its economy. Before the ongoing
world economic crisis that started in 2008, the Russian crisis of 1998, and the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was another shock that happened even before Belarus
regained its independence: the Chernobyl2 disaster in 1986. Almost 25 years later, this
event still a¤ects the Belarusian economy, and there is an on-going debate over the
socioeconomic consequences of this radioactive catastrophe. The goal of this essay is
to investigate its long-term impact on health, education, and wages in Belarus.
On April 26, 1986, reactor number four of the Chernobyl nuclear plant at the bor-
der of the Soviet republics of Belarus and Ukraine exploded. A series of subsequent
explosions and the resulting re sent clouds of highly radioactive particles into the at-
mosphere and resulted in radioactive fallout over an extensive geographical area. Large
areas of Belarus, northern Ukraine, parts of the Russian Federation were contaminated;
radioactive clouds later reached Scandinavia and Western Europe. According to vari-
ous estimates, up to seventy percent of all radioactive substances has fallen on Belarus,
and almost a quarter of its territory has been a¤ected (Reiners et al., 2008). While the
medical and physical consequences of the Chernobyl accident have been widely doc-
umented in the literature, the long-term socioeconomic consequences of the accident
have received little attention with a few exceptions (Almond et al., 2009; Lehmann
and Wadsworth, 2009). As many countries increasingly rely on nuclear power as a
source of energy and as radioactive waste storage expands and ages, it is important to
learn about the possible socioeconomic consequences of potential radiation accidents,
including explosions and leakages. Such accidents require a large diversion of state re-
sources to deal with the consequences, and the knowledge of the relationship between
radiation, public health, and socioeconomic development will allow the formulation
of a more e¢ cient policy response. Examining the links between radiation exposure,
2The Ukrainian spelling Chornobylis used less frequently.
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health, and labor market outcomes will provide the estimates of the direct and indirect
costs of such accidents.3
In this essay, we study the relationship between the exposure to radiation in child-
hood due to the Chernobyl accident and the subsequent health, education, and labor
market outcomes using the available nationally representative samples from Belarus.
We treat radiation exposure as an exogenous shock because the radiation fallout was
distributed randomly enough across Belarus according to the distance to the reactor,
the prevailing wind patterns, di¤erential rainfall levels, and local topography. Condi-
tional Independence Assumption for the fallout is satised by the nature of this event,
as it was completely independent from any future education and labor market out-
comes for several reasons: 1) Chernobyl happened long before these outcomes were
determined; 2) Chernobyl was not located in the Homyel region of Belarus, but in
Ukraine4 (the exact spot for the nuclear plant was picked by civil engineers according
to land structure that is unrelated to the socioeconomic situation of the area); and
3) Wind patterns that determined the fallout were certainly not determined by the
socioeconomic situation in Belarus around 1986.
We start our analysis by examining the relationship between the extent of irradia-
tion in the region of residence for persons who were 1 to 10 years old at the time of the
accident and sets of health, education, and labor market measures 15 and more years
later. We use the di¤erences in radiation dosage by region and by age at exposure
to identify the causal e¤ect of the accident on educational attainment, labor market
performance, and health using a di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimation. We look at the
long-term impact of the radiation on self-reported health measures, education, and la-
bor market performance 15 and more years after the accident by utilizing the variation
across regions and birth cohorts. We try to strengthen the validity of our results by
3The Chernobyl disaster proved to be the worst nuclear accident ever, to be matched only by the
very recent crisis at the Fukushima powerplant in Japan.
4There are no nuclear power plants in Belarus, but numerous reactors of the same type RBMK
were built in the USSR, some close to Belarusian borders: Apart from Chernobyl, these are Ignalina
(Lithuania) to the North-West, Kursk (Russia) to the South-East, and Smolensk (Russia) to the
East. (Russian Federation: Nuclear Power Reactors, Power Reactor Information System - PRIS at
http://www.iaea.org/cgi-bin/db.page.pl/pris.db57.htm, accessed August 11, 2010.)
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accounting for a range of confounding factors.
Our results suggest that persons living in the a¤ected regions and of younger age at
the time of the Chernobyl accident have lower wages. As for the educational outcomes,
they are less conclusive possibly due to the privileges that applicants from the a¤ected
regions have in the education system of Belarus. We also nd an e¤ect on job-related
health issues but not on self-reported health status or hospitalization measures. The
identication is not 100% clear though, mainly because of the deciencies in the data,
as we use a household budget survey not specically designed to address our particular
research question. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study to quantify
the impact of the Chernobyl disaster on education and labor market outcomes in the
Republic of Belarus, the most heavily a¤ected among all countries.
The rest of the essay has the following structure. Section 3.2 summarizes the
literature on radiation-induced health e¤ects. Section 3.3 describes the consequences
of the Chernobyl accident for Belarus. Section 3.4 describes the data, and Section
3.5 discusses the methodology and identication strategy for estimating the e¤ects
of radiation with these data. Section 3.6 presents the results from the reduced-form
estimates of the e¤ects of radiation on outcomes. Section 3.7 o¤ers conclusions and a
discussion of the results.
3.2 Literature review
Social sciences have long recognized a large positive correlation between health and
socioeconomic outcomes such as education, wages, and employment. The link between
poor health experienced in childhood and poor education and socioeconomic outcomes
in adulthood has been widely documented in the research (Case, Lubotsky, and Pax-
son, 2002; Case, Fertig, and Paxson, 2005). However, understanding the long-term
consequences of a negative health shock received in childhood has presented serious
challenges in empirical work due to the endogeneity that arises from the omitted vari-
ables and measurement error in the measure of health. Unobservable factors that lead
to both poor health and poor economic performance would result in a downward bias
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in the OLS estimates of the e¤ect of poor health on socioeconomic outcomes. While the
majority of existing empirical studies report only correlational relationships between
health and socioeconomic outcomes such as education and income (see literature sur-
veys in Grossman and Kaestner, 1997; Strauss and Thomas, 1998), a growing literature
attempts to establish a causal link between poor health and socioeconomic outcomes.
Empirical research that has attempted to estimate this causal e¤ect utilized vari-
ous strategies, including instrumental variables, within-family comparison using twins
and siblings, experimental and quasi-experimental approaches, and generally found a
negative impact of poor health on educational and economic outcomes. For example,
Kremer and Miguel (2004) use a randomized assignment of a deworming treatment to
primary schools in Kenya and nd a signicant reduction in school absenteeism but no
gains in academic performance as a result of treatment. Bleakley (2007) exploits the
di¤erential timing of exposure of di¤erent birth cohorts to a large-scale public health
intervention against hookworm in children in the American South circa 1910 and nds
improvement in health, larger gains in income, and higher rates of return to schooling
as a result of treatment. Maccini and Yang (2009) use geographical variation in rain-
fall around the time of birth of Indonesian adults born between 1953 and 1974 and
nd that higher early-life rainfall has large positive e¤ects on the adult socioeconomic
status of women, but not of men, with the benets mediated by improved schooling
attainment. Fletcher and Lehrer (2008) exploit the di¤erences in genetic inheritance
among children within the same family and nd evidence of poor mental health having
a large impact on academic achievement.
Several studies use environmental shocks to identify the e¤ect of health on the
socioeconomic status and labor market performance. Almond (2006) exploits the 1918
inuenza pandemic and nds that cohorts in utero during the pandemic displayed
reduced educational attainment, lower income, and lower socioeconomic status later in
life. Meng and Xiang (2006) use regional variation in famine intensity in China and
nd that childhood exposure to famine had signicant adverse e¤ects on adult health
and work capacity. Reyes (2007) makes use of state-specic reductions in lead exposure
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that resulted from the removal of lead from gasoline under the Clean Air Act and nds
that the reduction in lead exposure in childhood in the late 1970s and early 1980s was
responsible for the signicant declines in violent crime in the 1990s.
In the context of literature relying on natural experiments, the Chernobyl accident
can be viewed as an exogenous environmental shock to health with an inuence that
varies by the extent of irradiation. Evidence suggests that exposure to the radiation
varied geographically (see Figure 3.1), by age at exposure, and by population density
(Lehmann and Wadsworth, 2009). This type of exogenous variation was used in the
previous literature to identify the causal e¤ect of health on education and labor market
outcomes. Almond, Edlund, and Palme (2009) the utilize variation in radiation fallout
in Sweden by region and nd the cohort in utero during the Chernobyl accident had
worse school outcomes than adjacent birth cohorts, and this deterioration was the
largest for those exposed approximately 8-25 weeks post conception. Lehmann and
Wadsworth (2009) use the variation in the local area level of radiation fallout from the
Chernobyl accident as an instrument to establish the causal impact of poor health on
labor force participation, hours worked, and wages in the Ukraine and nd a positive
association between the local area-level radiation dosage and a health perception based
on a self-reported poor health status but only a weak e¤ect of poor health on labor
market performance.
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Figure 3.1. Degree of radioactive contamination and number
of post-Chernobyl thyroid cancer cases in children and adoles-
cents in various regions of Belarus
Source: Pacini, Vorontsova, Molinaro, Kuchinskaya, Agate, Shavrova, Astachova, Chiovato, and
Pinchera (1998).
Note: The number of cases and percentage of all cases are indicated for each region. Belarus has
two o¢ cial languages: Belarusian and Russian. So, the names of Belarusian cities can have di¤erent
spellings in English: Homyel/Gomel, Mahilyow/Mogilev, Vitsyebsk/Vitebsk, and Hrodna/Grodno
correspondingly.
In this essay, we argue that radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl accident pro-
duced disparities in health by age at exposure and region of residence. The magnitude
of radioactive contamination was the highest in Belarus compared to any other country
due to predominantly southeastward winds at the time of the accident. The most heav-
ily contaminated areas of Belarus are in the Homyel/Gomel5 region (oblast) followed by
Mahilyow/Mogilev and Brest regions. However, certain parts of the country, notably
the Vitsyebsk/Vitebsk region and most of the Hrodna/Grodno region, su¤ered very lit-
tle. Moreover, Belarus is a relatively homogeneous country with some minor historical
and cultural di¤erences along an East-West dimension, but not North-South. A very
wide range of radiation dosage across the regions should make identication of the ef-
5Belarus has two o¢ cial languages: Belarusian and Russian. So the names of Belarusian
cities can have di¤erent spellings in English: Homyel/Homiel/Gomel, Mahilyow/Mogilev, Vit-
syebsk/Vicebsk/Vitebsk, and Hrodna/Grodno correspondingly.
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fects of radiation more precise. In addition, the e¤ect of radiation was age-specic with
children ages 14 and below being more vulnerable and ages 0-4 especially vulnerable to
radiation due to radioactive iodine-131 (131I), which concentrates in the thyroid gland
(Bespalchuk, Demidchik, Demidchik, Gedrevich, Dubovskaya, Saenko, and Yamashita,
2007; Farahati, Demidchik, Biko, and Reiners, 2000; Reiners, Demidchik, Drozd, and
Biko, 2008; IAEA, 2005; Balonov, 2007; WHO, 2006).
3.3 Background on the health e¤ects of Chernobyl
in Belarus
3.3.1 Thyroid malignancies
One of the principal radioactive elements released during the Chernobyl accident was
iodine-131 (131I), and its release was signicant for the rst few months. The thyroid
gland accumulates iodine from the blood stream as part of its normal metabolism.
Iodine-131 was absorbed by the thyroid gland and caused internal irradiation in the
vast majority of Belarus inhabitants through inhalation and ingestion of foodstu¤s,
especially milk, containing high levels of 131I. Among those exposed, children and ado-
lescents received maximum doses. Drinking milk from cows that ate contaminated
grass immediately after the accident is considered one of the main reasons for the high
doses to the thyroid of children. Consumption of food contaminated with radioactive
iodine resulted in signicant doses to the thyroid as well.
Even though in 1986 the entire population of the Republic of Belarus was exposed
to radioactive 131I, the thyroid doses varied in a wide range, according to age, level of
ground contamination with 131I, and the milk consumption rate. Reported individual
thyroid doses reached 50 Gy, with average doses in contaminated areas being about
0.03 to few Gy, depending on the region where people lived and on their age.
Childhood thyroid cancer caused by radioactive iodine fallout is one of the main
health impacts of the accident.6 The thyroid gland is one of the organs most susceptible
6Reiners et al. (2008) summarize the impact as follows: Proven radiation related increase of
thyroid cancer incidence in children and adolescents (total number of cases approximately 5.000,
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to cancer induction by radiation. Children were found to be the most vulnerable pop-
ulation, and a substantial increase in thyroid cancer among those exposed as children
was recorded after the accident (IAEA, 2005). Thyroid cancer in children occurs rarely
in most countries around the world except for the Republic of Belarus (International
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) of WHO and the International Association of
Cancer Registries, 1998). A strongly age-dependent risk for thyroid cancer was also
observed in the Japanese population after the atomic bomb explosions with the high-
est risk in the group of children below the age of 10. After the Chernobyl accident,
children from Belarus living in highly exposed regions received mean thyroid doses by
radioactive fallout approximately twice as high as compared to the survivors of the
atomic bomb explosions in Japan (Reiners et al., 2008).
There is little doubt in the literature that the Chernobyl accident was responsible
for the abnormal increase in thyroid cancer incidence in the a¤ected areas. According
to Bespalchuk et al. (2007), three major factors are indicative of the radiogenic nature
of thyroid cancer. The rst is the high prevalence of the disease; before the Chernobyl
accident, the incidence of thyroid cancer was very low both in children and in adults.
The second factor is geographical: the majority of children and adolescents diagnosed
for thyroid carcinoma lived in the southern areas of the Belarus located close to the
place of catastrophe. The third factor is the detected dosee¤ectcorrelation.
In certain parts of Belarus, an estimated 36.4 per cent of children who were under
four when the accident occurred can expect to develop thyroid cancer. Farahati et al.
(2000) studied the association between disease severity and age at radiation exposure
in a cohort of 483 patients younger than 8 years at the time of the Chernobyl acci-
dent who have been diagnosed with thyroid carcinoma. The majority of patients were
from the Homyel region and the south-eastern parts of the Brest region. Younger age
at the time of the Chernobyl accident was associated with greater cancer complica-
tions. Compared with patients who were 6.18 years old at the time of the accident,
patients who were younger than 2 years had signicantly more cancer complications.
highest incidence in age-group 0-4). No di¤erence in risk between males and females.
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The researchers believe that the rapid cellular growth that occurs in children under 2
facilitated a quicker and broader development of the cancer. By 2008, radiation was
linked to an increase of thyroid cancer incidence in children and adolescents amounting
to approximately 5000 cases with the highest incidence in the age group of 04 years
in 1986 (Balonov, 2007; Reiners et al., 2008).
In addition to cancer, the exposure to Chernobyls radioactive iodine caused chil-
dren to have more antithyroid antibodies than other children. These antibodies may
cause the children to develop hypothyroidism later7 (Pacini et al., 1998). Ostroumova,
Brenner, Oliynyk, McConnell, Robbins, Terekhova, Zablotska, Likhtarev, Bouville, Sh-
pak, Markov, Masnyk, Ron, Tronko, and Hatch (2009) conducted a study to quantify
the risk of hypothyroidism prevalence in relation to 131I doses received because of the
Chernobyl accident. They found a signicant relationship between the prevalence of
hypothyroidism and individual 131I thyroid doses due to environmental exposure. In
several studies conducted in Belarus and Ukraine, a signicant increase in the rates of
juvenile hypothyroidism was reported in children living in radionuclide-contaminated
areas compared with children from uncontaminated areas (Goldsmith, Grossman, Mor-
ton, Nussbaum, Kordysh, Quastel, Sobel, and Nussbaum, 1999; Quastel, Goldsmith,
Mirkin, Poljak, Barki, Levy, and Gorodischer, 1997; and Vykhovanets, Chernyshov,
Slukvin, Antipkin, Vasyuk, Klimenko, and Strauss, 1997).
3.3.2 Other health e¤ects of Chernobyl
While thyroid cancer is the most demonstrable health impact of Chernobyl, a number
of other illnesses, including lung diseases, digestive and blood disorders, birth defects,
fertility problems, and immune deciencies have a greater incidence in the radiation-
a¤ected areas (UNDP 2002). Acute Radiation Syndrome was the most immediate
7Hypothyroidism is an underactive thyroid gland, meaning that the gland cannot make enough
thyroid hormone to keep the body running normally. When thyroid hormone levels are too low,
the bodys cells cannot get enough thyroid hormone and the bodys processes start slowing down.
As the body metabolism slows, the patient gets becomes tired more easily, becomes forgetful
and depressed, and gains weight. Denition taken from the American Thyroid Association, 2010,
http://www.thyroid.org/patients/patient_brochures/childhood.html
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e¤ect of irradiation due to the release of radioactive particles, which primarily consisted
of isotopes of uranium and plutonium (the most toxic), iodine-131, strontium-90, and
cesium-137, but it a¤ected relatively few people, mostly those who directly participated
in the liquidation of the e¤ects of the disaster on the powerplant itself.
Later on, high levels of radioactive cesium in milk and meat as well as in wild
foods (e.g. berries and mushrooms) caused major radiological problems. However
according to Balonov (2007), since 1986, radiation levels in the a¤ected environments
have declined several hundred times because of the natural processes of radioactive
decay and countermeasures by the authorities. Therefore, many of the previously
contaminated territories are now safe for settlement, agriculture, and other economic
activities. Most of the 600,000 emergency and recovery operation workers and ve
million residents of the contaminated areas in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine received
relatively minor radiation doses, higher but comparable with the natural background
levels.
However, apart from the dramatic increase in thyroid cancer incidence among those
exposed at a young age, there is no clearly demonstrated increase in the incidence of
solid cancers or leukemia due to radiation in the general public in Belarus. Several
studies cited a notable increase in psychological problems among the a¤ected popu-
lation, compounded by insu¢ cient communication about radiation e¤ects and by the
social disruption and economic depression that followed the break-up of the Soviet
Union (see Lehmann and Wadsworth 2009). Some studies cited Chernobyl AIDS,
which is characterized by a weakened immune system and a susceptibility to cardiac
conditions and common infections (bronchitis, tonsillitis, and pneumonia). There have
been reports of the e¤ects of Chernobyl on mental health manifested in anxiety and
depression. A number of studies have found reduced cognitive functions due to pre-
natal radiation in the high fallout areas of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, e.g., Nyahu,
Loganovsky, and Loganovskaja (1998); Kolominsky, Igumnov, and Drozdovitch (1999);
and Loganovskaja and Loganovsky (1999). Almond et al. (2009) provide an extensive
literature review on the cognitive damage due to the exposure to radiation.
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3.4 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on 2001-2008 waves of the Belarusian Household Budget
Survey (BHBS). BHBS was started in 1995, and a random sample of approximately
5,000 households are interviewed every year. BHBS represents the most reliable and
comprehensive8 source of micro-data in Belarus. In addition to various demographic
and labor force variables, it contains information on self-assessed health status and
hospitalizations.
We use two age groups: people born in 1982-1985 (treatment) and in 1976-1979
(control), who are 16-32 years old in 2001-2008. In total, there are 13,441 individuals
in the 8 years of data we use, but not all information is available for all of them (see
Table 3.1). Because the rst half of the 1980s was the time of the highest birth rates
in Belarus, the treatment group represents 56% of the data versus 44% for the control
group.
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics, analysis sample
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Rural 13441 0.25 0.43 0 1
City >100,000 13441 0.51 0.5 0 1
Male 13441 0.44 0.5 0 1
Age 13441 23.53 4 16 32
Year born 13441 1980.9 3.19 1976 1985
Year dummy 13441 2004.43 2.3 2001 2008
Young (born in 1982-1985) 13441 0.56 0.5 0 1
High Fallout: Homyel 13441 0.16 0.37 0 1
youngXHigh_Fallout 13441 0.09 0.28 0 1
Medium Fallout: Minsk city, Brest, Mahilyow 13441 0.45 0.5 0 1
youngXMedium_Fallout 13441 0.26 0.44 0 1
8Still, the geographic breakdown is by regions (oblasts) only. Unfortunately, BHBS data with a
ner breakdown by districts (raions) do not exist.
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Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Secondary education + 10276 0.99 0.07 0 1
University diploma 10276 0.15 0.36 0 1
Currently employed 8979 0.85 0.35 0 1
Monthly wage, main job (2001 BYR) 8026 12551.14 8501.19 0.03 123000
Number of medical visits 11876 0.71 1.47 0 72
Poor health9 10489 0.03 0.17 0 1
Hospitalized 11872 0.14 0.34 0 1
Job health issues 11603 0.03 0.18 0 1
Moved in 1986 13441 0.06 0.25 0 1
Moved after 1986 13441 0.66 0.47 0 1
Source: The authorsown calculations based on the BHBS.
The descriptive statistics for our sample are reported in Table 3.1. Labor market and health vari-
ables are standard, but education outcomes need some special explanation. Our variable Secondary
education +refers to any education10 beyond basic education, and the variable University diploma
refers to any diploma of higher education and above.
3.5 Methodology
Our empirical strategy is based on the observed geographic and age di¤erences in
irradiation. Given the evidence that southern and eastern regions (Homyel, Mahilyow,
Brest) received more fallout than the northern and western regions (Vitsyebsk, Hrodna,
Minsk) (see Figure 3.2), we exploit the regional di¤erences in the amount of radiation
dose.
9As pointed out by Lubomir Lizal, one could expect more people reporting poor health than being
hospitalized, if the e¤ects of hypohondria were widely spread. In this case, the higher number of
hospitalizations could mean that young people indeed have poor health, but do not feel that way.
10School education in Belarus is divided into three levels: primary (4 years), basic (5 more years),
and secondary (2 more years) up to 11 years in total. A child can be admitted to school at 6
or 7 years of age. Primary and basic education are compulsory for all children. At the end of basic
education, a Certicate of Basic Education is awarded. 9th grade graduates have three possibilities: 1)
a third stage of school education (10-11th grades); 2) vocational/technical establishments; 3) technical
schools. Secondary education starts at 15 and is provided by general secondary schools or gymnasiums
(10-11th grades), lyceums and colleges (not to be confused with US-type colleges), as well as in rst
courses of specialized and technical schools. Since 1994, the higher education system includes: a
diploma of higher education after 5 years of study (specialist diploma); a bachelor degree certicate
after 5 years of study; and a masters after one additional year following the rst degree.
81
Figure 3.2. Thyroid dose patterns for children aged 018 years
Source: Kruk, Pröhl, and Kenigsberg (2004), Fig. 13.
Given the higher impact of radiation at early ages, we exploit the variation in age
at exposure (1986). Lehmann and Wadsworth (2009) have a similar strategy, they use
an indicator for a child (under 13) at the time of the accident interacting with the
dummy variable for residence in the a¤ected areas. Almond et al. (2009) argued that
young children and those in the womb appear to be more vulnerable to radiation, and
used the variation in radiation across Swedish regions to compare the performance of
those in utero to the performance of those born before and after 1986. We estimate










+05D(young)ijt Medium_Falloutj + 0Xij + 0tt+ "ijt: (3.1)
Here, yijt is health, education or labor market outcome of person i living in region
j in a year t. We consider educational outcomes (having at least secondary education,
having a university diploma); labor market outcomes (being currently employed, wage
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at the main job); and health outcomes (reporting poor health, reporting being hospi-
talized in the last 12 months, reporting job health issues, and/or reported number of
medical visits in the last 3 months).
We only use people who were born before the accident. Further, we restrict the
earliest year of birth in the analysis sample to be 1985 because we do not observe the
exact month of birth and are therefore unable to distinguish between those born before
and after April 26, 1986. In addition, since there was a major break in the labor markets
in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we do not include those who entered the
labor force before 1991 and therefore faced similar labor market conditions.11 Thus,
D(young)i is an indicator variable =1 for a younger age in 1986 and =0 otherwise.
Given that the most dramatic increase of thyroid cancer was in children who were
under age 4 at the time of accident (Bespalchuk et al., 2007; Kruk et al., 2004; Reiners
et al., 2008), we choose our treatmentgroup to be 14 years old in 1986 (born in
19821985), and the controlgroup as 710 years old in 1986 (born in 19761979).12
The young dummy would capture any xed di¤erences in educational attainment
and labor market experiences in a given year between people of di¤erent ages, as well
as general economy-wide time trends that drive changes across cohorts.
The nest geographic unit available in the data is region (oblast); therefore, we
are only able to compare the average radiation exposure across regions. The average
thyroid dose received by residents of the Homyel region (0.30.35 Gy) was over 30
times the dose in the una¤ected regions (Hrodna, Minks, Vitebsk), while the average
thyroid dose in other a¤ected regions (Mahilyow and Brest oblasts, Minsk city) was
approximately 6 times the dose in the una¤ected regions (See Figure 3.3).
11Assuming that labor market entry starts at age 16 (most people at this age still continue their
secondary education, but some choose not to), we are left with ages 110 in 1986 (i.e. ages 615 in
1991 and 1625 in 2001).
12We exclude those aged 56 during the disaster because there is no consensus in the medical
literature about the exact e¤ect of Chernobyl on this age group.
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Figure 3.3. Average thyroid doses for the age group 018 years
in all Belarus oblasts and in the cities of Homyel/Gomel and
Minsk
Source: Kruk et al. (2004), Fig. 14.
Therefore, our geographic identiers are:
High_Falloutj is an indicator variable for the Homyel region that received the
most radioactive contamination.
Medium_Falloutj is an indicator variable for the group of other regions with
elevated observed levels of radioactive contamination (Mahilyow and Brest oblasts,
Minsk city13). These two indicators will control for any xed di¤erences that exist
between the a¤ected and non-a¤ected regions.
Finally, Xij include controls for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics
available in the BHBS, such as gender and rural/urban dummy. Year dummies are
included to control for general economy-wide trends.14
13The city of Minsk did not receive more radioactive fallout than the surrounding region, but tens
of thousands of people from the most contaminated districts were relocated there, and more people
moved there voluntarily from the moderately a¤ected districts see the next footnote.
14We also need to control for potential migration due to Chernobyl. If younger, more productive
people migrated at higher rates from the a¤ected regions, our estimate of the e¤ect of Chernobyl, dd
may pick up this phenomenon unless we control for the place of residence at the time of the accident.
Migration data are not available in the BHBS, but appropriate questions have been included in the
Census of 2009, as of April 2011, data still not available to outside non-governmental researchers.
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Our main hypothesis is that the coe¢ cients on interaction variables < 0, i.e. people
who were younger in 1986 and lived in the a¤ected regions have lower education, poorer
health, and lower wages than those who were younger in 1986 in the non-a¤ected
regions, relative to their older counterparts.
3.6 Results
The descriptive statistics for the analysis sample are reported in Table 3.1.
A possible mechanism for the e¤ect of radiation on education and labor market
outcomes is through its e¤ect on health. In order to explore this pathway, we look at
the e¤ect of radiation exposure on a series of self-reported health outcomes in Table
3.2.
Table 3.2. Regressions for self-reported health variables
Variable Bad health, probit Hospitalized, probit
Young (born in 1982-1985) 0.013** -0.006 -0.018* -0.01
High Fallout: Homyel 0.030*** -0.011 0.019 -0.014
youngXHigh_Fallout -0.006 -0.008 0.015 -0.019
Medium Fallout: Minsk city, Brest, Mahilyow 0.019*** -0.006 -0.009 -0.011
youngXMedium_Fallout -0.005 -0.007 0.015 -0.015
Moved in 1986 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.015
Moved after 1986 -0.008** -0.004 0.009 -0.007
Rural 0.006 -0.005 0.001 -0.009
City >100,000 0.005 -0.004 -0.021** -0.008
Male 0.005 -0.003 -0.059*** -0.007
Year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 10489 11872
Pseudo R-squared 0.045 0.014
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Variable Job health issues, probit Ln(medical visits)
Young (born in 1982-1985) -0.011** -0.005 -0.02 -0.067
High Fallout: Homyel -0.001 -0.006 0.258*** -0.083
youngXHigh_Fallout 0.019 -0.011 -0.044 -0.113
Medium Fallout: Minsk city, Brest, Mahilyow -0.027*** -0.005 0.106 -0.067
youngXMedium_Fallout 0.020** -0.009 0.048 -0.087
Moved in 1986 0.005 -0.007 0.079 -0.091
Moved after 1986 -0.005 -0.004 -0.012 -0.045
Rural 0.027*** -0.006 -0.133** -0.06
City >100,000 0.004 -0.004 0.184*** -0.051
Male 0.004 -0.003 -0.220*** -0.042
Year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 11603 3987
Pseudo R-squared 0.039 0.014
Source: The authorsown calculations based on the BHBS.
Note: Signicance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses, adjusted for arbitrary heteroskedasticity. For probit regressions, marginal e¤ects are reported.
Clustering errors by regions or using logit instead of probit had no e¤ect on the results.
Before turning to our main results, we present a quick overview of the results on
the control variables. There is no signicant e¤ect of living in a village or in a big city
(versus a medium-sized town). Poor health (self-evaluation) is signicantly higher
among those from more or less a¤ected regions (Homyel, Brest, Mahilyow, Minsk city)
and for those born in 19821985. Similar to our nding, Lehmann and Wadsworth
(2009) found a signicant positive association between the self-reported measure of poor
health and residence in contaminated areas in 1986 for all adults living in Ukraine in
2003 and 2004. The probability of hospitalization during the last year is hardly a¤ected
by any of the explanatory variables, except being born in 19821985, living in a big
city, and being male (all three are correlated negatively). As for the number of medical
visits during the last 3 months preceding the interview in December, people from big
cities or from the most a¤ected Homyel region had more of them.
The evidence for the e¤ect of the accident on health is not conclusive.15 The
15In the 1990s, the BHBS included a variable Chernobyl inuenced (=1 if a person reported
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interaction terms in the regression for poor health are negative and not statistically
signicant. On the other hand, the likelihood of reporting job health issues is higher
for those born in 1982-1985 if they come from the regions a¤ected by the Chernobyl
disaster. The lack of the e¤ect of Chernobyl on health outcomes and hospitalizations
parallels the nding of Almond et al. (2009). However, the radiation doses received by
the treated group in that study were an order of magnitude smaller than in Belarus.
Table 3.3. Regressions for educational outcomes
Variable Secondary educ.+, probit University dipl., probit
Young (born in 1982-1985) -0.002 -0.002 -0.165*** -0.012
High Fallout: Homyel -0.003 -0.004 0.017 -0.012
youngXHigh_Fallout -0.001 -0.003 0.016 -0.021
Medium Fallout: Minsk city, Brest, Mahilyow -0.002 -0.002 0.044*** -0.009
youngXMedium_Fallout 0.001 -0.002 -0.021 -0.013
Moved in 1986 -0.001 -0.002 0.009 -0.015
Moved after 1986 0.004** -0.001 0.025*** -0.007
Rural -0.006** -0.003 -0.066*** -0.007
City >100,000 0 -0.001 0.057*** -0.008
Male -0.002 -0.001 -0.034*** -0.006
Year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 10276 10276
Pseudo R-squared 0.095 0.169
Source: The authorsown calculations based on the BHBS.
Note: Signicance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses, adjusted for arbitrary heteroskedasticity. For probit regressions, marginal e¤ects are reported.
Clustering errors by regions or using logit instead of probit had no e¤ect on the results.
We follow by looking at the e¤ect of Chernobyl on the educational outcomes (Table
being seriously or partially inuenced by Chernobyl). This indicator may reect, among other things,
non-physical health issues related to Chernobyl, including psychological issues. We nd a positive and
highly statistically signicant association between this variable and all indicators of poor health in
the years 1999-2002 (results not shown). Unfortunately, this variable disappears from the BHBS after
2002; therefore we cannot use it.
The extent of the psychological e¤ect on various generations is not totally conclusive: On the one
hand, the old could more vulnerable psychologically as they were more aware of what happened at
the time of the accident, as pointed out by one of the referees. On the other hand, the young are very
perceptive to what they hear from their parents, which can result in a higher psyhological e¤ect on
them.
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3.3). We do not nd a statistically signicant e¤ect of exposure to radiation at a
younger age on the probability of having at least secondary education (the e¤ect may
be biased downwards because some people in our younggroup may still be completing
their secondary education). There is no signicant e¤ect of Chernobyl on university
education either. However, we hypothesize that because of special privileges, applicants
from a¤ected regions have higher chances of being admitted to a university. This
hypothesis is supported by the positive and signicant coe¢ cients for those living
in Homyel oblast and in other a¤ected regions. Of course, these privileges are not
restricted to people of certain age, so the coe¢ cient atD(Y oung)Medium_Fallout is
negative, meaning that those a¤ected by Chernobyl in their early childhood have worse
educational outcomes, in spite of the privileges; however, this e¤ect is not statistically
signicant.
Table 3.4. Regressions for labor market outcomes
Variable Currently empl., probit Ln(wage on main job)
Young (born in 1982-1985) -0.051*** -0.013 -0.222*** -0.02
High Fallout: Homyel -0.014 -0.015 -0.033 -0.025
youngXHigh_Fallout -0.025 -0.024 -0.105*** -0.036
Medium Fallout: Minsk city, Brest, Mahilyow -0.013 -0.012 0.013 -0.023
youngXMedium_Fallout -0.016 -0.018 -0.024 -0.035
Moved in 1986 -0.002 -0.016 -0.007 -0.042
Moved after 1986 0.018* -0.009 0.053** -0.021
Rural -0.021* -0.011 -0.209*** -0.019
City >100,000 -0.003 -0.01 0.125*** -0.016
Male 0.024*** -0.008 0.264*** -0.016




Source: The authorsown calculations based on the BHBS.
Note: Signicance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses, adjusted for arbitrary heteroskedasticity. For probit regressions, marginal e¤ects are reported.
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Clustering errors by regions or using logit instead of probit had no e¤ect on the results. Education
attainments are not included in the wage regression because they constitute bad controls, being
themselves outcome variables in the notional experiment at hand(Angrist and Pischke, 2009); we
are interested in the reduced e¤ect of Chernobyl on earnings, including the part of that e¤ect that
goes via education.
We continue our analysis by looking at the labor market outcomes: the probability
of being currently employed and wages in the current year (Table 3.4). We do not
nd a signicant e¤ect of the Chernobyl accident on the probability of being employed.
We nd a signicantly negative e¤ect on wages for the younger people from the most
a¤ected region (Homyel): The coe¢ cient of -0.105 implies that their wages are lower
by 10%.16 Combined with a statistically signicant e¤ect of Chernobyl on job health
issues(see Table 3.2) this could suggest that this variable is indeed one of the channels
of the e¤ect of Chernobyl on labor market outcomes. However, after adding the variable
job health issues, the e¤ect of youngXHigh_Fallout remains statistically signicant
in the wage regression. After putting this variable into the wage equation yields a co-
e¢ cient of -0.186 (signicant at 1% level), while the coe¢ cient at youngXHigh_Fallout
decreases at its absolute value from -0.105 to -0.090 (staying signicant at 1% level),
suggesting that at least 10% of the e¤ect of Chernobyl on wages is accounted for by
job health issues.
3.7 Conclusions and discussion
The Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986 had deleterious health consequences for the
population of Belarus (in particular, thyroid malignancies), especially for children be-
low 4 years of age at the time of the disaster. This essay utilizes the natural experiment
generated by this nuclear accident, which produced a sizable increase in radiation levels
16Pastore and Verashchagina (2006) use a dummy variable equal to one if a person declares that
his health was seriously a¤ected by the Chernobyl disaster as one of the explanatory variables in their
wage regression. They nd that the Chernobyl wage gap ... was almost zero in 1996 and amounted
to about 18% of the median wage in 2001.(p. 365) We can not replicate this result because of two
reasons: 1) Our treatment group was still too young in 2001. 2) The question about the e¤ect of
Chernobyl on health disappears from the BHBS in 2002.
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in Belarus irrespective of any other factors. Using the 2001-2008 waves of the Belaru-
sian Household Budget Survey, we estimate the e¤ect of radiation on schooling, labor
market and health outcomes among the cohorts and regions that varied in the amount
of exposure. We nd that younger children coming from the more contaminated re-
gions had more job-related health issues and lower wages than those who were older
at the time of the accident and who came from the less contaminated regions. While
we did not nd an e¤ect on education, this may be due to the special privileges for the
applicants from the contaminated regions.
Our analysis nds some support for the hypothesis that the e¤ect of radiation on
education and labor market outcomes can be attributed to the e¤ect of radiation on
health based on the self-reported measures. If our hypotheses were supported, we would
be identifying a more interesting relationship and answering a more general question:
What is the causal e¤ect of health on education and labor market outcomes?
There are several potential caveats to our analysis. First, a potential problem with
the self-reported health measures is that individuals tend to assess their health by
comparison to those in their immediate surroundings (parents, siblings, and friends).
Therefore, children coming from a¤ected families will likely answer that their health
appears not too bad by comparison. A family xed e¤ects strategy could eliminate the
measurement error due to such a pattern of health self-reporting.17
Second, there is a possibility of di¤erential (and possibly non-linear) trends. Regions
that were a¤ected may have experienced pre-existing trends in development (health,
education, and labor market) than non-a¤ected regions. Even though Belarus has a
relatively homogenous population, some regions may historically be less developed than
other regions (in the case of Belarus, East versus West).
17The reported health status e¤ect may be due to real impacts from exposure, but it also may be a
self-fullling prophecy since those who were exposed expect to have negative impacts on their health
and are so sensitive to every little ache and pain. This could also a¤ect doctor visits. Since the most
objective evidence is a real disease diagnosis, our measures job health issuesand hospitalizations
should better reect the health e¤ect of Chernobyl. An alternative explanation to our results consistent
with Lehmann and Wadsworth (2009) is the psychological e¤ect of disruption to family life of having
relocation/refugee status for those living close to the site or even parental stress, which will impact
younger children more than older ones.
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Third, there may be di¤erential e¤ects on child mortality by level of exposure
(survivor bias). One example of a bias is when wealthier people live farther from the
plant and so their children were more likely to survive. This would bias the e¤ect on
labor market outcomes of children. In addition, higher mortality among the a¤ected
population would tend to bias our results towards zero. However, according to the
medical literature (Bespalchuk et al. 2007, Farahati et al. 2000, Balonov 2007; Reiners
et al. 2008), only a tiny fraction of the population developed thyroid cancer (only about
5000 cases per 10 million population by 2008), and very few of these patients died. Most
other people develop intermediate stages of thyroid disease, which do not signicantly
impact mortality rates and only show up in higher morbidity rates. Therefore, survivor
bias is unlikely to impact our results signicantly.
Fourth, migration occurred within Belarus after the Chernobyl disaster. If those
who migrated also had di¤erent characteristics related to education and labor market
outcomes, then the estimated coe¢ cient would pick up the e¤ect of selective migra-
tion, biasing the e¤ect of irradiation on the outcomes. However, it should be noted
that migration in the USSR (especially in the rural areas) was strictly controlled by the
government due to the institution of propiska. This made migrating to another re-
gion very di¢ cult. Also, immediately following the Chernobyl accident there was very
little information released to the public on the adverse health e¤ects of radiation.18
Notably, there was a May 1st parade in Kiev held as usual right after the catastrophe
on April 26 1986, some 90 km (about 56 miles) away from the burning power plant. In
an attempt to evaluate the inuence of selective migration on our results, we exploited
migration variables available in the 1999 Belarus Census. In particular, we compared
characteristics of migrants from the region of birth between the a¤ected and una¤ected
regions (Appendix, tables A4 and A5). We did not nd that migrants from the more
a¤ected regions (Homyel, Brest and Mahilyow) who migrated after 1986 are system-
18Medvedev (1990) documents in detail the widespread negligence and under-reporting after the
catastrophe. For example, he writes that the population of Pripyat was not warned about the accident
nor was the civil defense headquarters informed. Since the civil defense sta¤ had no information about
the situation, they took no measures. As a result, the usual rhythm of life on Saturday proceeded . . .
The evacuation began only 36 hours later and was conducted according to a newly worked-out plan.
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atically di¤erent in their observable socioeconomic characteristics from migrants from
the less a¤ected regions (Hrodna, Vitsyebsk, and Minsk) who migrated before 1986.
Thus, to the extent that our radiation exposure variable is measured with a random
error, our results would be conservative estimates of the radiation exposure.
Fifth, parents in more a¤ected regions might had invested more resources in health
and education in order to o¤set the e¤ect of irradiation. If unaccounted for, di¤erential
investment by parents would tend to bias the estimated e¤ect of irradiation towards
zero.
Finally, there were government support programs for the population a¤ected by
Chernobyl. If unaccounted for, they would tend to bias the estimated e¤ect of irradi-
ation towards zero. Our nding of positive coe¢ cients on the a¤ected dummy in the
regression for university diploma provides an indication of such possibility.
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Appendix
Table A4. Characteristics of out-migrants from the region of
birth
Out-migrated on/after 1986 Out-migrated before 1986
Born in Homyel Mean SD Born in Homyel Mean SD
Secondary education 0.71 0.454 Secondary education 0.753 0.431
University degree 0.15 0.357 University degree 0.251 0.433
Professional occupation 0.194 0.396 Professional occupation 0.283 0.451
Employed 0.482 0.5 Employed 0.609 0.488
White collar occupation 0.001 0.038 White collar occupation 0.003 0.051
Age in 1999 32.517 18.777 Age in 1999 48.84 15.582
Male 0.467 0.499 Male 0.407 0.491
Married 0.517 0.5 Married 0.706 0.456
Number of children 0.9 0.918 Number of children 0.933 0.874
Rural 0.293 0.455 Rural 0.155 0.362
Big city 0.476 0.499 Big city 0.672 0.47
Born in Brest or Mahilyow Mean SD Born in Brest or Mahilyow Mean SD
Secondary education 0.776 0.417 Secondary education 0.763 0.425
University degree 0.193 0.395 University degree 0.28 0.449
Professional occupation 0.222 0.415 Professional occupation 0.328 0.47
Employed 0.452 0.498 Employed 0.644 0.479
White collar occupation 0.002 0.049 White collar occupation 0.005 0.068
Age in 1999 29.54 17.397 Age in 1999 48.218 14.835
Male 0.462 0.499 Male 0.43 0.495
Married 0.469 0.499 Married 0.718 0.45
Number of children 0.736 0.86 Number of children 0.969 0.877
Rural 0.222 0.416 Rural 0.156 0.363
Big city 0.591 0.492 Big city 0.641 0.48
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Out-migrated on/after 1986 Out-migrated before 1986
Born in Hrodna, Mean SD Born in Hrodna, Mean SD
Minsk, Vitsyebsk Minsk, Vitsyebsk
Secondary education 0.734 0.442 Secondary education 0.751 0.433
University degree 0.185 0.388 University degree 0.241 0.428
Professional occupation 0.191 0.393 Professional occupation 0.293 0.455
Employed 0.437 0.496 Employed 0.61 0.488
White collar occupation 0.001 0.028 White collar occupation 0.001 0.033
Age in 1999 25.991 16.324 Age in 1999 47.208 16.219
Male 0.466 0.499 Male 0.41 0.492
Married 0.448 0.497 Married 0.704 0.456
Number of children 0.883 0.918 Number of children 0.885 0.892
Rural 0.256 0.436 Rural 0.185 0.389
Big city 0.469 0.499 Big city 0.559 0.496
Source: The authorsown calculations based on the Belarusian Population Census of 1999.
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Table A5. Di¤erences in the characteristics of migrants be-
tween a¤ected and una¤ected regions
Born in Homyel Born in Brest or Mahilyow
Coe¢ cient Std. Error Coe¢ cient Std. Error
Secondary education -0.026 0.014 0.029* 0.013
University degree -0.045 0.027 -0.030 0.018
Professional occupation 0.014 0.024 -0.004 0.019
Employed 0.046 0.024 -0.018 0.019
White collar occupation -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001
Age in 1999 4.894*** 0.709 2.539*** 0.499
Male 0.004 0.014 -0.023* 0.011
Married 0.068** 0.010 0.008 0.010
Number of children -0.031 0.072 -0.231** 0.083
Rural 0.068*** 0.015 -0.004 0.007
Big city -0.105** 0.037 0.040 0.026
Source: The authorsown calculations based on the Belarusian Population Census of 1999.
Note: Coe¢ cients and standard errors are estimated from a regression on the variable Born in
Homyel and out-migrated from Homyeland Born in Brest or Mahilyow and out-migrated from Brest
or Mahilyoweach interacted with the indicator for having migrated after 1986 (omitted category is
Born in Hrodna, Vitsyebsk, or Minsk and out-migrated from Hrodna, Vitsyebsk, or Minsk), where
other regressors include the dummies Born in Homyel and out-migrated from Homyel, Born in Brest
or Mahilyow and out-migrated from Brest or Mahilyowand Migrated after 1986. The estimation
sample includes all migrants who left their region of birth.
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